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Abstract: The dissertation incorporates poststructuralist discourse analysis and critical IR 
perspectives to analyze Russian discourses on military interventions pertaining to the Post-
Soviet/ Near Abroad region. It tries to answer the following question: How did Russian 
diplomats and politicians discursively construct Russia’s military interventions in Georgia and 
Ukraine? To that purpose, I propose a two-fold theoretical and analytical framework informed 
by poststructuralist and critical IR insights.  
First, I choose to interpret Russian contradictory legal discourse of military interventionism by 
referring to the literature on the subaltern empire. Accordingly, Russian discursive construction 
of intervention can be situated within a hybrid subaltern context, wherein Russian politicians 
and diplomats must replicate the hegemonic discourse of new interventionism, albeit in a 
subversive manner, to articulate the country’s subaltern agency and make sense of Moscow’s 
violations of neighboring countries’ sovereignty.  
Secondly, to examine the discursive construction of Russia’s military interventionism, the 
dissertation attempts to ‘read’ Russian interventions in Georgia and Ukraine in terms of the 
production of the Self/Other essential to the discourse of post-Cold War new interventionism. 
To facilitate the analysis of Russian intervention narratives, the subject of scrutiny is broken 
down into three major components: representations of the Subject, representations of the Others 
and imaginative geographies of the intervention. Subsequently, the dissertation applies this 
analytical framework to deconstruct the official discourses pertaining to Russia’s interventions 
in South Ossetia and Ukraine. 
Structurally, the dissertation is divided into a theoretical part and an analytical part. The first 
section of the theoretical part offers an overview of the development of Russia’s approach to 
normative issues regarding humanitarian intervention and R2P in the post-Cold War context. 
The second section furnishes a critical review of the literature on Russia’s discourses of 
humanitarian intervention and R2P informed by the English School and norm-oriented 
constructivist IR theories. Building from this critical review, a case for the application of the 
postcolonial theory-inspired subaltern empire theory is then made. The last section of the 
theoretical part is spent to elaborate the poststructuralist framework concerning the analysis of 
how Russia’s humanitarian intervention narratives produced the Self, Other and imaginative 
geographies. In the analytical part, composed of the subsequent three chapters, I employed the 
designated analytical framework to analyze the discursive construction of Russia’s military 
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The remit of this dissertation is to examine the discursive construction of Russian 
military interventionism, particularly through comparative case studies of Moscow’s 
official discourses on the Russo-Georgian war and Russia’s military intervention in 
Ukraine. Among International Relations (IR) scholars of late, the subject of Russian 
interventionism has attracted a growing number of followers, due to Moscow’s 
increasingly assertive foreign policy toward the ‘Near Abroad’ (blizhneye zarubezhye), 
of which the abrupt annexation of Crimea in 2014 and subsequent entanglements in the 
Donbas were the latest manifestations.  
The history of Russia’s post-Soviet military interventionism, however, stretches 
back to the foundation of the Russian Federation itself in 1991, with other significant 
instances being the so-called Russian ‘peacekeeping operations’ in Moldova, Georgia 
and Tajikistan during the 1990s (Facon 2006, Luca 2015). Starting in 2015, Russian’s 
ongoing military campaign in Syria also marks the first large-scale intervention by the 
Russian military in a country outside the former Soviet Union (Myers & Schmitt 2015). 
Moscow’s aggressive behaviors are widely regarded as highly disruptive to the 
European and international security status-quos, and certain scholars began to 
contemplate the looming ‘new Cold War’ between the West and Russia (Karaganov 
2014, Trenin 2014b, Lucas 2014; for a critique of the new Cold War framework, see 
Sakwa 2008). 
A bone of contention concerning Russian military interventions in the Near 
Abroad lurked in the contemporary Russian leadership attitudes regarding humanitarian 
intervention and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). While Russia is keen to portray 
itself as a latter-day champion of Westphalian sovereignty and non-intervention, it has 
not hesitated to infringe on neighboring countries’ sovereignty, citing as justifications 
real and imagined tribulations suffered by Russian compatriots abroad. Russia’s 
intervention in Georgia in 2008, in particular, was considered the first instance whereby 
a state invoked the doctrine of R2P, formulated and adopted by the UN in the early 
2000s, to justify its use of force against another country. In an assessment of the Russian 
approach to peacekeeping in the 1990s, Facon (2006: 36) also noted that “Russian 
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peacekeeping behavior seems to have directly contradicted its declared ambitions of 
strengthening its integration in the community of ‘civilized nations’”.  
More recently, Russia’s problematic invocations of humanitarian intervention 
and R2P have received much-needed attention from scholars like Allison (2009, 2013, 
2014), Averre and Davies (2015), Baranovsky and Mateiko (2016), Holmes and 
Krastev (2015), and Kuhrt (2015). In trying to make sense of Russia’s discourse of 
interventionism, these scholars turned to the distinction between solidarist and pluralist 
visions of the international system as well as the norm-oriented constructivist analytical 
framework as explanatory tools. Generally, according to these approaches, Russia’s 
attitude to military interventionism and R2P was characteristic of the position taken by 
the pluralist group of states in the international society. Like other countries in this 
group, Russia champions the principle of sovereign equality associated with the age-
old Westphalian system as well as the UN Security Council’s ascendancy in normative 
issues related to military interventions and R2P. As insightful and extensive as they are, 
however, these analyses often overlooked the similarities between the Russian and the 
hegemonic discourses of interventionism and the glaring inconsistencies in Russia’s 
approaches to military interventions within and without its post-Soviet neighborhood.  
Therefore, to address this lacuna, I propose to engage the analysis of Russia’s 
military interventionism with the postcolonialism-informed literature on Russia’s 
subaltern empire status. Specifically, drawing from the conceptualization of the Russian 
brand of subalternity offered by Morozov (2013, 2015), the dissertation interprets the 
inconsistencies in Russia’s discourses of humanitarian intervention and R2P as 
symptomatic of its hybridity and lack of normative alternative to the Western core’s. In 
more conventional IR terms, it can be argued that Russia behaves globally as a 
revisionist or counter-/anti-hegemonic power vis-à-vis the West (often matching its 
grievances with those of emerging non-Western powers), while primarily pursues 
status-quo/ hegemonic aspirations with respect to the Near Abroad, even to the extent 
of militarily intervene in neighboring countries on the pretext of protecting Russian 
citizens and compatriots. An empirical corollary of examining Russia’s military 
interventionism through the lens of subalternity lies in the possibility of reading it as a 
‘borrowed’ or hybrid discourse, which simultaneously reproduces – yet also distorts – 
the hegemonic post-Cold War discourses of humanitarian intervention and R2P. In 
other words, whilst remaining vehemently opposed to the West’s hegemonic discourses 
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of human rights, humanitarian intervention and R2P, post-Soviet Russia still has no 
alternative but to turn to the very same reference frames to construct its military actions 
against other post-Soviet countries.  
In trying to validate the above-mentioned empirical assumption, I choose to 
analyze the Russian discourse of military interventionism as a repertoire of heroic 
storylines involving the geopolitical struggles between the Russian Subject and the 
Western as well as the Georgian/ Ukrainian antagonistic Others. Such an analytical 
approach also represent a departure from previous analyses, in which the emphasis was 
placed on the formal normative values of Russian leaders’ articulations. Instead, I 
follow the analytical approach of poststructuralist IR, according to which Subjectivity 
is constantly (re)produced through the distinction between the Self and the Other 
furnished by foreign policy discourses and practices. Interventionary discourses thus 
are significant not only in terms of representing subjective/ intersubjective views; more 
importantly, they operate through the production of the Subject conducting the 
intervention and of Others whom the self must either defend or defeat (Orford 2003). 
These discourses or narratives invite their intended audience to identify with certain 
notions of the Self, thus functioning to interpellate members of the audience into 
subject positions conducive to the maintenance of the internal and/or international 
hegemonic order (Orford 2003: 160-162). Additionally, poststructuralist 
understandings of identity suggest that subjectivity is constantly (re)produced through 
post factum narrations of events as well as contemporaneous ‘micronarratives’ which 
cause and/ or influence the course of events and actors’ behaviors and attitudes 
(Campbell 1998: 35-43). Accordingly, this dissertation will examine the production of 
the Subject/ Self and Objects/ Other as well as the imaginative geographies underlying 
them in Moscow’s official discourses of military interventions. 
The dissertation’s original contribution to the existing literature is two-fold. 
First, the dissertation endeavors to link up the literature on Russia’s imperial 
subalternity or subaltern empire condition with the empirical analysis of the Russian 
discourses of military interventionism. Secondly, in terms of the analytical framework, 
the dissertation also proposes a poststructuralist alternative to the norm-oriented 
framework employed by previous studies about Russia’s official discourses of military 
interventionism. Structurally, the dissertation is divided into a theoretical part and an 
analytical part. The first section of the theoretical part offers an overview of the 
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development of Russia’s approach to normative issues regarding humanitarian 
intervention and R2P in the post-Cold War context. The second section furnishes a 
critical review of the literature on Russia’s discourses of humanitarian intervention and 
R2P informed by the English School and norm-oriented constructivist IR theories. 
Building from this critical review, a case for the application of the postcolonial theory-
inspired subaltern empire theory is made. The last section of the theoretical part is spent 
to elaborate the poststructuralist framework concerning the analysis of how Russia’s 
humanitarian intervention narratives produced the Self, Other and imaginative 
geographies. In the analytical part, composed of the subsequent three chapters, I 
employed the designated analytical framework to analyze the discursive construction 




II. PUTTING RUSSIA’S INTERVENTIONISM INTO THE FRAMEWORK 
OF SUBALTERNITY 
1. The Development of Post-Soviet Russia’s Approach to Military 
Interventionism  
The aim of this section is to provide an abbreviated account of Russia’s 
problematic approach to peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention and R2P from the 
1990s to the present, which furnishes a background for my subsequent theoretical and 
empirical analysis of the subject. Specifically, it highlights key issues related to 
Moscow’s international peacekeeping practice in the 1990s and Russia’s attitude 
toward the emerging post-Cold War consensus on humanitarian intervention and R2P, 
from its criticisms of NATO’s military campaign against Yugoslavia to the current 
resistance to the West’s invocations of R2P. 
1.1. Russian-style Peacekeeping Operations in the Near Abroad 
During the first decade of its existence, Russia’s stance on interventionism was 
shaped by the country’s experiences of peacekeeping (mirotvorchestvo, literally 
‘peacemaking’) in the post-Soviet area and by its opposition to NATO’s intervention 
in Kosovo (Allison 2013: 45-70, 121-140; Lynch 2000). From the very beginning, 
Russia’s interventions in the nascent post-Soviet neighborhood under the guise of 
international peacekeeping1 were plagued by contradictions and inconsistencies. Such 
military involvements were initially spearheaded by the ad hoc responses of Soviet/ 
Russian forces located near or in the conflict zones2, often with limited strategic 
direction or inputs provided by Moscow, which during that period was still struggling 
to reassert authority over the armed forces (Hopf 2005: 226; Lynch 2000: 31-32; 
Tsygankov 2013: 79-87). Therefore, in the eyes of international observers, Russia’s 
claims upon impartiality and consent of the parties involved – two core requirements 
of international peacekeeping – were, at a minimum, unconvincing. Bureaucratic in-
fighting among various departments, noticeably between the Ministry of Defense 
                                                           
1 Specifically, in Moldova, Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and Tajikistan. 
2 The Soviet/ Russian 14th Army was stationed in Moldova when the fighting broke out in March 1992 and 
provided military support to the Transnistrian side. Similarly, Soviet/ Russian troops in Tajikistan, chiefly the 
201st Motorized Rifle Division, and the Group of Forces in the Transcaucasia (GFTC) in Georgia played key roles 




(MoD) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)3, also undermined the formulation 
and implementation a coherent peacekeeping policy (Lynch 2000: 32). The absence of 
clear international or regional mandates, notwithstanding the government’s pronounced 
efforts to legitimize military interventions as international peacekeeping and secure the 
recognition of CIS states4, posed another significant challenge to the legitimacy and 
legality of Russia’s interventionism. Consequently, Russia’s peacekeeping operations 
in the post-Soviet region were regarded as problematic and ‘non-standard’ (Finch 1996, 
Lynch 2000: 178-179), or worse, as clear violations of international norms on 
peacekeeping and sovereignty (Hopf 2005: 225-226).  
Some of the abovementioned shortcomings and contradictions have persisted 
into Russia’s latest round of military interventions in Ukraine – for example, Moscow 
tends to become a hostage to previous political commitments, even when they no longer 
have any strategic values to the regime. More importantly, the 1990s can be considered 
Russia’s formative years when it comes to Moscow’s military interventionism, as 
Russian ‘unusual’ exercises in peacekeeping during this period had arguably left certain 
important imprints on Moscow’s subsequent interventionary policies. Thus, for the 
benefit of this study, it is worth considering the idiosyncrasies of Russian-style 
international peacekeeping in more detail. 
First, albeit receiving little external recognition, Russia was adamant to present 
its military interventions as legitimate, effective and compatible with international as 
well as regional norms and values. The addition of international peacekeeping to 
Russia’s foreign policy toolbox evidenced the importance of emulating Western 
concepts and practices for the legitimacy of post-Soviet Russia’s military interventions. 
According to Kellett (1999) and Nikitin (2013: 159-160), the concept of international 
peacekeeping gained currency in Russia and the CIS only after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, whose erstwhile attitude toward such a ‘Western’ practice was mainly 
characterized by indifference and abstention. In contrast, it was observed that the 
Russian Federation had “devoted a substantial proportion of its limited military 
                                                           
3 The MoD and MFA reportedly clashed over the direction of Russian peacekeeping forces in 1992-1993, and in 
the case of Tajikistan, the MoD also quarrelled with the Border Troop Command ( Lynch 2000: 9-11) 
4 For instance, in Moldova, Russia proposed to form a CIS peacekeeping force consisting of Belorussian, 
Ukrainian, Russian and Moldovan army units. The proposal failed to materialize because Belarus and Ukraine 
declined to participate (Finch 1996). 
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manpower and finances to UN, multinational, and regional peacekeeping missions” 
(Kellett 1999: 40) during the first few years of its existence.  
 Additionally, Russia’s efforts to develop the appearance of international 
peacekeeping, if not the actual capability for it, were not limited to ad hoc military 
operations and contributions to UN missions. As, in 1995, the State Duma adopted a 
new law on this subject5, establishing a comprehensive legal framework for the 
provision of personnel and resources for international peacekeeping missions. Earlier, 
stipulations related to international peacekeeping also appeared in Russia’s first 
military doctrine adopted in 1993 (Trenin 1996: 75). Thus, in strict formal terms, post-
Soviet Russia’s swift moves to invoke and institutionalize the practice of peacekeeping 
marked a fundamental departure from the modus operandi of its predecessor, and 
demonstrated Moscow’s willingness to recognize, at least nominally, the authority of 
international norms with regards to the use of force in international relations.  
The Russian discourse of peacekeeping, however, was accompanied by certain 
‘modifications’ to the standard format of international peacekeeping, which 
detrimentally affected the West’s perception of Russian-style military interventions. A 
moot point was the connection between Russian peacekeeping operations and 
Moscow’s insistence on its right and ‘responsibility to protect’ Russian citizens or 
diasporas in the Near Abroad (Allison 2013: 126-128). At the time, the leadership 
generally avoided stipulating the protection of Russian citizens abroad as an official 
goal of Russia’s regional peacekeeping missions, preferring to subsume it under the 
more neutral objectives of defending human rights and ethnic minorities (ibid.). 
Elsewhere, however, Russian officials and politicians were more vocal and explicit in 
their opinions regarding this issue6. The 1993 military doctrine also identified “the 
                                                           
5  “On Procedures for Deploying Civil and Military Personnel for Activities Related to the Maintenance or 
Restoration of the International Peace and Security” (Nikitin 2013: 169-170). 
6 For example, the then Minister of Defense, Pavel Grachev, bluntly stated in June 1992: “If the honor or dignity 
of the Russian population are wounded in any region, I shall take the most decisive actions, even the insertion of 
troops to put a stop to discriminations, assaults and attacks” (Lynch 2000: 48). Similarly, the commander of the 
14th army in 1992, Alexander Lebed (who later ran as a candidate in the 1996 presidential election) compared the 
Moldavian authorities to ‘fascists’ and the conflict unfolding there to a ‘genocide’ (Lynch 2000: 116, Tsygankov 




suppression of the rights, freedom and legitimate interests of Russian citizens abroad” 
as one of the main sources of military danger to the Russian state7 (Lynch 2000: 79).  
Another bone of contention between Moscow and the West over the status of 
Russian-styled international peacekeeping/ military interventions was the former’s 
expressed desire to establish a post-Soviet ‘zone of responsibility’ or ‘sphere of 
legitimate interests’, as well as its adamant refusal to allow any ‘external’ powers, such 
as Turkey or the U.S., to dispatch peacekeepers to the Near Abroad (Lynch 2000: 93, 
Allison 2013: 124-126). Keeping the peace (or protecting Russian citizens, for that 
matter) was thus perceived as the ostensible objective of Russian military actions, 
intended to sugarcoat the true purpose of reasserting Russia’s hegemonic predominance 
over its newly independent neighbors. Unsurprisingly, the aptly termed “Russian 
Monroe Doctrine” was a principle cause for the West’s displeasure at Russia and 
Russian-style military interventions both in the 90s and in 2008, when it was revived 
by president Medvedev as the fifth principle of his eponymous doctrine (Allison 2013: 
124; Medvedev 31.08.2008). 
In the final analysis, Russian-style international peacekeeping can be best 
described as a peculiar amalgamation of traditional peacekeeping and coercive 
diplomacy, designed to help counterbalancing post-1991 centrifugal tendencies and 
asserting Moscow’s claims for exclusive rights to adjudicate and, when it deemed 
necessary, intervene militarily in local disputes within the Near Abroad/ CIS region. 
During and after the peacekeeping operations, Russian policymakers eagerly touted the 
country’s irregular peacekeeping conducts as ‘innovations’ and ‘Russian contributions’ 
to the world, even to the extent of framing Russian-style peacekeeping activities as 
“alternatives to ‘classical’ UN standards for peacekeeping operation” (Allison 2013: 
130) notwithstanding the West’s disapprovals and criticisms. In a subsequent section, I 
will attempt to demonstrate how postcolonial IR theory is well-suited to account for the 
hybridity in Russia’s discourses and practices of military interventionism. In the next 
subsection, I will turn to another important facet of the Russian discourse, which is 
                                                           
7 The language of the final text was relatively moderate compared to the draft doctrine, circulated in May 1992, 
according to which “a violation of the rights of Russian citizens and of persons who identify themselves with 




Moscow’s uneasy relationship with the U.S. and Europe’s discourses and invocations 
of humanitarian intervention and R2P. 
1.2. Russia and the Post-Cold War Development of Humanitarian Interventions and 
R2P 
The purpose of this subsection is to present a brief overview of Russia’s primary 
position with regards to the post-Cold War development of humanitarian interventions 
and R2P, from the controversy surrounding NATO’s intervention in Yugoslavia to 
Russia’s opposition to the West’s applications of R2P’s third pillar. It shows that, 
notwithstanding occasional invocations of humanitarianism, Russia’s leadership 
generally dissents from the pro-interventionary stand taken by Western states 
concerning the permissibility of military intervention for humanitarian purposes, often 
in solidarity with other non-Western governments (i.e. China, India, other BRICS and 
G-77 states). 
Despite maintaining an active peacekeeping presence in the Near Abroad/ CIS 
area, Russia reacted with indignation to NATO’s controversial military campaign 
against Yugoslavia, Operation Allied Force (OAF), in 19998 (Allison 2013: 45). Earlier, 
the Soviet Union/ Russia had lent support to the West’s interventionist policy and 
international security agenda, particularly with respect to the First Gulf War, the 
conflict between Serbs and Muslims in Bosnia, the U.S.-led intervention in Haiti and 
Western sanctions against Yugoslavia, Iraq and Libya9 (Allison 2013: 126-127, 
Tsygankov 2013: 74-75). However, by 1996, the so-called ‘honeymoon period’ in the 
relationship between Russia and the West had effectively ended. Under the direction of 
Yevgeny Primakov, who became Foreign Minister and later Prime Minister, Moscow’s 
diplomatic stance on humanitarian intervention quickly toughened. For instance, in 
1998, Primakov warned that any military actions that NATO might possibly take in 
response to Yugoslavia’s alleged ethnic cleansing in Kosovo must, without exception, 
be sanctioned by the UNSC (Allison 2013: 50).  As permanent members of the UNSC, 
Russia and China joined efforts to prevent any resolutions concerning Kosovo 
                                                           
8 The content of and legal basis for Moscow’s arguments against OAF and NATO’s military interventionism have 
been examined in detail elsewhere (for example, see Allison 2013: 45-70, also Kuhrt 2015: 100-102). Therefore, 
it is the purpose of this part to only sketch out the broad outline of Russia’s position regarding this pivotal case. 
9 Interestingly enough, Russia’s acquiescence to the collective intervention in Haiti in 1994 (Operation Uphold 
Democracy) might have been gained in exchange for the U.S.’s following endorsement of Russian peacekeeping 
mission in Abkhazia (Allison 2013: 127, Kuhrt 2015: 100). 
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(especially No. 1199 and 1203) to explicitly authorize, or be interpreted as authorizing 
military actions against Yugoslavia (Allison 2013: 47-48). Thus, NATO’s decision to 
commence the bombing of Yugoslavia in March 1999 – citing Belgrade’s failure to 
comply with Resolution 1199 as the justification – was immediately denounced by 
Russia as an illegal use of force against a sovereign state and a serious violation of the 
UN’s jurisdiction (Allison 2013: 49-51, Tsygankov 2013: 109-111). 
NATO’s military intervention in the conflict in Kosovo was a critical episode 
in the evolution of the post-Cold War humanitarian intervention. One of the ways in 
which the dispute was discursively constructed (especially by lawyers on both sides) 
was as a ‘war of values’ between two core principles, namely sovereignty and 
humanitarianism. On the one hand, OAF was vindicated by Western interventionists as 
a ‘just war’ that heralded the era of liberal interventionism, wherein the moral duty to 
stop war crimes and save lives would have precedence over the increasingly out-of-date 
Westphalian sovereignty (Glennon 1999, Kuhrt 2015: 100-102). On the other hand, 
Russia’s leadership regarded (and still regards) this instance as the epitome of Western 
exceptionalism. It questioned whether NATO’s aims and conducts were justified, 
expressing the apprehension that OAF had established a dangerous precedent which 
would be exploited by powerful states to bypass the UNSC and intervene with impunity 
in the internal affairs of other countries (which, ironically, became a self-fulling 
prophecy when Russia invoked Kosovo to justify the annexation of Crimea) (Kuhrt 
ibid). Eventually, the Russian leadership was pressured to accept by the inevitable – to 
avoid further escalation, President Yeltsin appointed former Prime Minister Viktor 
Chernomyrdin to lead the peace negotiation with NATO and Yugoslavia, who 
eventually succeeded in persuading Yugoslavia to accept the West’s terms for peace, 
which were previously deemed as ‘unacceptable’ by Moscow and Belgrade (Tsygankov 
2013: 111). The bitter dispute, however, has had significant and long-lasting 
implications for Moscow’s view on Western-led humanitarian interventions ever since; 
specifically, after OAF, Russia generally shared with non-Western states like China and 
India the voice of dissent regarding the collective use of force for humanitarian 
purposes (Allison 2013: 68).  
September 11th and the consequent inception of the U.S-led global ‘war on 
terror’ in 2001 were perceived as temporarily alleviating differences regarding military 
interventions between the West and Russia (Allison 2013: 72-98). Russia’s frustration, 
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however, quickly resumed with the United States’ decision to wage the Iraq War in 
2003, and was exacerbated by a series of ‘color revolutions’ in Georgia, Ukraine and 
Kyrgyzstan, which Moscow’s officials openly described as being backed by 
Washington (Kuhrt 2015: 102-103). It was against this very backdrop of international 
politics and Russia-West relations that the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect, a 
U.N-initiated project to forge a universal consensus on international humanitarian 
norms and criteria guiding the use of military force for humanitarian purposes, was 
being introduced (in 2001) and eventually adopted by the UN General Assembly at the 
2005 World Summit10. 
Russia’s support for the adoption and further development of R2P, like that of 
many non-Western states (notably China and India), was lukewarm and included 
significant reservations – especially with regards to R2P’s third pillar. Although Russia 
accepted in principle the obligation of the international community or regional 
organizations to intervene in an individual state without the consent of its government 
to prevent or preclude humanitarian catastrophes – which, after all, resembled the legal 
basis of its peacekeeping operations in the 1990s – it maintained that any such attempts 
to use force must, first and foremost, be approved by the UNSC (wherein Russia and 
China can exercise their veto power). Furthermore, it opined that the situations in 
question must also meet the criteria of a threat to ‘international peace or security’ as 
defined by Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Allison 2013: 66-67).  
Thus, even as the UN General Assembly unanimously endorsed the Outcome 
Document on R2P at the 2005 World Summit, it should be noted that the language of 
the document had been significantly watered-down to accommodate the views of states 
like Russia, China and India (Allison 2013: 67-68, Kuhrt 2015: 103). Additionally, 
while other P-5 members (the U.S., U.K. and France) initially opposed or expressed 
concerns about R2P as well, they did so for reasons very different from those of Russia 
or China: the U.S. government feared that the criteria stipulated by R2P would 
constraint its ability to use force whenever and wherever it deemed necessary, while 
                                                           
10 R2P consists three main principles or pillars: (1) Each state has the responsibility to protect its populations from 
the “three crimes” of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity; (2) The international 
community has the responsibility to encourage and provide assistance to individual states in fulfilling that 
responsibility; (3) If a state is evidently failing to protect its populations, the international community must be 
prepared to take appropriate collective action in a timely and decisive manner and in accordance with the UN 




the U.K. and France were similarly concerned that the need for UNSC’s authorization 
would impede timely and decisive responses to humanitarian crises (Bellamy 2009: 67). 
Considering the fact that Moscow had shown very little enthusiasm for R2P, its move 
to invoke the Responsibility to Protect as a legal justification for its ‘peace enforcing’ 
operation in August 2008 was therefore astonishing and widely regarded as a cynical 
abuse of R2P (Allison 2013: 158-159, Kuhrt 2015: 108). 
 Notwithstanding its invocation of R2P in the case of Georgia, however, in the 
following years, Russia remained mostly unwilling to sanction any UN collective 
actions based on R2P’s third pillar to resolve humanitarian crises. A rare exception was 
when Russia (along with China, India, Brazil, and Germany) abstained from voting on 
the pivotal Resolution 1973 in March 2011 – the adoption of which constituted the legal 
justification for NATO’s military intervention in Libya. However, Moscow later 
accused the Western powers of going beyond the UN mandate and the original scope 
of the Resolution, as well as engineering regime change in Libya on the pretext of 
humanitarian intervention (Allison 2013: 172-174; Averre & Davies 2015: 818). With 
respect to the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Syria, Russia and China continue to 
adamantly resist all attempts on the part of Western democracies to obtain UNSC’s 
authorization for potential military actions against the Syrian government. 
Notwithstanding the invocations of R2P it had employed to justify its interventions in 
Georgia (and more recently Ukraine), Russia’s leadership are at great pains to portray 
itself as one of the staunchest proponents of sovereign equality (which has its root in 
the Westphalian system). As such, Moscow considered itself, together with China, as 
the main challengers to Western attempts of applying the principles of R2P worldwide. 
Russia’s 2013 Foreign Policy Concept, for instance, unequivocally expressed the 
government’s disdain for Western states’ invocations of R2P for the purpose of 
conducting humanitarian interventions: “It is unacceptable that military interventions 
and other forms of interference from without which undermine the foundations of 
international law based on the principle of sovereign equality of states, be carried out 
on the pretext of implementing the concept of “Responsibility to Protect”” (Concept of 
the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, 2013). 
Focusing on Russia’s peculiar peacekeeping conducts in the 1990s and positions 
over the emergence of the Western-led consensus on humanitarian intervention and 
R2P, this section has provided a brief account of the development of Moscow’s 
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discourse and practices of military interventionism leading up to the Ukraine crisis in 
2014. It showed that in spite of employing various humanitarian principles to legitimize 
its military interventions, Moscow has been one of the main critics and opponents (with 
a few exceptions) of the Western-led projects to promote liberal interventionism and a 
new global normative order based on “sovereignty as responsibility” (Kuhrt 2015: 106-
107). The account provided in this section also suggested that Russia’s post-Cold War 
discourse of military interventionism is inconsistent and hybridized; viewed through 
the lens of subalternity, such a discourse can be considered a syndrome of the Russian 
state’s hybrid subaltern-cum-imperial condition. Taking this into consideration, the 
next section of the dissertation will provide a critical review of the existing literature 
on Russian military interventionism to understand how the development of Russia’s 
stand on military interventionism has been previously construed. 
2. Understanding Russia’s Military Interventionism: English School and Norm-
Oriented Constructivist Analyses and the Postcolonial/ Poststructuralist 
Alternative 
In this section, I discuss two main theoretical approaches within the extant 
scholarship on Russia’s post-Cold War discourse of military interventionism, namely 
the English School and constructivism. The section then moves on to show what 
insights poststructuralist and postcolonial approach can contribute to the literature, 
especially in terms of understanding the (counter-)hegemonic aspirations and hybridity 
inherent in Russia’s discourses of humanitarian intervention and R2P. 
2.1. English School and Norm-Oriented Constructivist Approaches 
Within International Relations, contemporary discussions about humanitarian 
intervention and R2P tend to derive from or be influenced by the thoughts of the English 
School and constructivism (Diez et al. 2011: 95; Bellamy & Wheeler 2008), and studies 
of the Russian state’s exercises in and discourses of military interventionism are not an 
exception (Allison 2013: 3, Averre & Davies 2015: 813-814). Although realist and 
liberalist scholars (as well as some social constructivists) have penned many influential 
studies about Russia’s military interventions, they are inclined to place no analytical 
importance on Moscow’s normative arguments and legal justifications, assuming that 
these assertions and justifications were either hypocritical or, more perniciously, acts 
of weaponization/ instrumentalization of normative language and thus should be 
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neglected in favor of systemic or individualistic explanations of Russia’s motivations 
(such as those based on geopolitical or psychological factors, diversionary war theory 
or elites’ configuration, etc.) (Götz 2016; McFaul 2014; Mearsheimer 2014; Shevtsova 
2010). On the other hand, because of their penchant for issues related to norms, values 
and socialization, English School’s and norm-oriented constructivist scholars are more 
inclined to produce (as well as more theoretically capable of producing) analyses of the 
normative dimension in Russia’s discourse of humanitarian intervention and R2P. 
Thus, in this section, I will summarize and assess the pertinence of previous analyses 
which are influenced by the two indicated theoretical approaches.  
The core tenets of the English School approach have been characterized as 
representing a middle-way between the mainstream IR discourses of realism and 
liberalism; while theorists of this school, following Hedley Bull (1977: 53-77), accepted 
a la realism the idea that the international is essentially a realm of anarchy – since states 
have no supreme authority to which they must look up – they made the claim that 
relations among sovereign states, which cannot be viewed simply as variations of a 
‘zero-sum’ game of national interests, are always constituted and governed to a certain 
extent by common interests, rules/ values and institutions (Diez et al. 2011: 121-122, 
Hehir 2010: 70; Linklater 2005: 84-92). The development of humanitarian intervention 
posed one of the most divisive normative issues engendered by the ‘international 
society’ of states as envisioned by English School scholars, since it involved clashes 
among several core principles of the international society, such as the international 
humanitarian norms, sovereign equality and non-intervention (Diez et al. 2011: 95; 
Wheeler 2000: 1).  
Conflicts among sets of normative principles and different visions of the 
international society manifested in the division between two theoretical strands within 
the English School tradition – solidarism and pluralism. On the one hand, solidarists 
maintain that the normative content of the international society is quite ‘thick’, i.e. there 
are certain normative principles and obligations with which all members of the 
international society must comply, and violations of/ failures to comply with those 
universal norms and values can become legitimate grounds for collective military 
interventions. Pluralists, on the other hand, are proponents of a ‘thinner’ version of the 
international society which emphasizes the centrality of states; they generally reject the 
legitimacy of humanitarian interventions, insofar as such interventions violate the rules 
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of sovereignty and non-intervention (which pluralists regard as the core principles of 
the international society) and are hence detrimental to the peaceful coexistence of states 
(Allison 2013: 16-17; Diez et al. 2011: 96; Hehir 2010: 70-71, Wheeler 2000: 309).  
Based on this distinction, English School-informed readings of Russia’s 
discourses of humanitarian intervention and R2P were quick to identify Moscow’s 
apparently strict adherence to sovereignty and non-interference with the pluralist 
camp’s core positions (Allison 2013: 17-18; Averre & Davies 2015: 813-814; Kuhrt 
2015: 98-99; Baranovsky & Mateiko 2016: 50). Such a framework of classification 
allows English School’s scholars to construe Russia and Western liberal democracies’ 
bitter disputes over humanitarian intervention and R2P as embodying the 
incompatibility between pluralist and solidarist conceptions of the international society.  
Specifically, advancing the pluralist standpoint, Averre and Davies (2015: 813) 
sought to refute the widely-held belief that Russia’s opposition to humanitarian 
intervention and R2P was merely an end product of its illiberal political system and 
power politics – they contended that the Russian discourse of R2P should be located 
within the context of the international society’s “structural and systemic change” since 
the end of the Cold War and Russia’s counterhegemonic quest for “a negotiated 
international order”. Accordingly, Russia’s current position reflects both changes in 
Moscow’s foreign policy thinking, especially since the beginning of Putin’s third 
presidential term, and the “increasingly pluralist context of debates on humanitarian 
intervention” (Averre & Davies 2015: 834). Emboldened by these developments, 
Russian elites put forth value-based narratives which emphasized “traditional moral and 
spiritual values” and “pluralist policy positions and values” as well as the centrality of 
the UN/ UNSC to challenge the West’s liberal-solidarist interpretations of R2P (Averre 
& Davies 2015: 828). Thus, the authors interpreted Russia and China’s restrictionist 
views of sovereignty and R2P in terms of the two non-Western powers’ dissatisfaction 
at the “disregard of their legitimate concerns by the Western liberal democracies” 
(Averre & Davies 2015: 829), and from the association between R2P’s third pillar and 
the doctrine of humanitarian intervention to which both countries are vehemently 
opposed.  
In a similar vein, Kuhrt (2015: 97) noted that Russia’s elites generally did not 
distinguish between the doctrines of R2P and humanitarian intervention, as they 
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regarded R2P to be a modified version of the same project on the part of the U.S.-led 
Western hegemony to rewrite existing international norms. Regarding the Russian 
perspective as characteristic of the pluralist approach (Kuhrt 2015: 98), she gave several 
explanations for Russia’s reservations toward R2P which can be summarized as follow: 
first, Moscow generally see itself as the guardian of the Westphalian world order, 
wherein sovereignty was regarded more as a right than a responsibility whilst 
international peace and security were maintained through the UN Security Council 
(which resembles a ‘Concert of Great Powers); secondly, Russian elites’ perceptions of 
the West’ invocations of R2P were tainted by their frustration and anxiety over the 
impunity with which NATO’s military intervention in Yugoslavia and the Iraq War had 
been conducted previously; and thirdly, as those of many non-Western states who have 
been increasingly contesting the West’s monopoly on humanitarian interventions and 
interpretations of R2P, the views on R2P of Russia must be located within broader 
debates on international humanitarian norms’ development.  
In addition to applying the distinction between pluralist and solidarist views, 
analyses of Russia’s approach to humanitarian intervention and R2P were also 
influenced to a great extent by the analytical frameworks put forward by norm-oriented 
constructivists such as Finnemore and Katzenstein (1996). Building on assumptions 
about the social dimensions of international relations (Wendt 1999) similar to those 
espoused by English School’s theorists (Reus-Smit 2002: 489), norm-oriented 
constructivists postulate that institutionalized norms play an important role in shaping 
the behaviors of international actors. Forasmuch as these actors, instead of relying 
solely on cost-benefit calculations or the “logic of consequentiality”, usually behave in 
conformity with the “logic of appropriateness”, i.e. doing what they consider 
appropriate according to the prevailing standards (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; March 
and Olsen 1998).   
Applying this theoretical approach to study the evolution of humanitarian 
intervention practices, Finnemore (1996, 2003) argued that states’ changing attitudes 
and behaviors regarding humanitarianism in the post-Cold War era can be attributed to 
systematic changes in the international normative context. These changes, in turn, can 
be tracked in the normative standards advocated by international actors. Central to 
Finnemore’s framework was the analysis of states’ discursive practices and “verbal 
adherence to norms through justifications” (Diez et al. 2011: 96). Specifically, she 
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argued that justifications for interventions are not “mere fig leaves” behind which states 
hide their self-interested, ulterior motives (Finnemore 1996). Justifications are 
important because they “speak directly to the normative context” and are attempts to 
“connect one's actions with standards of justice or […] standards of appropriate and 
acceptable behavior” (Finnemore 2003: 15). Furthermore, Finnemore argued that 
states’ actions may contradict international norms and standards which they have 
themselves articulated, but such contradictions do not preclude “patterns that 
correspond to notions of right conduct over time” from arising (Finnemore 1996: 159).  
Finnemore’s constructivist assumptions about the dynamics of the international 
norms regarding military intervention were prominently featured in Roy Allison’s 
seminal monograph on the evolution of Russia’s discourses of humanitarian 
intervention and R2P, the theoretical framework of which combined both English 
School’s and norm-oriented constructivist perspectives (2013). Analyzing Russian 
leaders’ articulations, Allison acknowledged, like Kuhrt and Averre & Davies, that 
Russia’s views essentially resembled those held by the “pluralist group of states in the 
international society” (Allison 2013: 4). Nonetheless, he departed somewhat from the 
treatment of Russia as a purely pluralist state and made the crucial observation that 
Russia is, to a certain extent, a hybrid or qualified pluralist state – because “it has been 
unwilling to position itself outside the Western, especially European, community of 
states and so has been reluctant to fully reject the normative language associated with 
it” (Allison 2013:17). 
 Indeed, Allison argued that Russia’s predominantly pluralist position was not 
always consistent; there were brief periods such as during the Gorbachev’s years, the 
early 1990s or at the onset of the Libyan crisis in 2013, whereby the Soviet/ Russian 
leadership appeared willing to overcome the normative incongruence regarding 
sovereignty and humanitarianism between Russia and the West. Furthermore, he 
construed Russia’s invocation of R2P to justify its intervention in Georgia in 2008, in 
terms somewhat similar to postcolonial theory’s, as a mixture of “instrumentalism” and 
“mimicking” (by which he implied that R2P was invoked as the result of Russia’s fear 
of social exclusion and loss of face) (Allison 2013: 213-214). Thus, it seems 
questionable to what extent constructivist concepts of internalization and socialization 
are relevant to the Russian case, since the Russian leadership had been quite capable of 
mimicking the normative language of Western solidarists without assuming a proper 
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commitment to implementing the international humanitarian norms that it occasionally 
articulated.  
Allison’s book also threw light on Russia’s pursuit of its own regional 
normative and hegemonic project. He noted that regarding the Near Abroad, Russia’s 
‘pluralism’ seemed even more problematic because the efforts to maintain a 
hierarchical power structure clearly limited the sovereignty of other states in the post-
Soviet region and weakened its vocal opposition to ‘qualified sovereignty’ elsewhere 
(Allison 2013: 214). Thus, he concluded that the inconsistency of Russia’s official 
discourse reflects “an effort to sustain a dual normative order, regional and global” 
(ibid, emphasis mine), which, as the result, gave rise to a set of ‘hybrid norms’ that has 
the potential to undermine the international normative and legal order on which the 
existence of those norms depends. However, he did not give any further elucidation on 
the concept of ‘hybrid norm’ beyond this conclusion.   
Altogether, the analyses that I have summarized should provide a representative 
picture of the extant scholarship on Russia’s complex attitudes to humanitarian 
intervention and R2P. The merits of studies informed by English School and norm-
oriented constructivist approaches are considerable. Challenging the rationalist 
approaches of neorealism and neoliberalism (which downplayed the normative and 
analytical importance of Russia’s legal justifications of military interventionism), 
English School and constructivist scholars have expounded the normative content of 
Russia’s discourses and situated them in the changing post-Cold War international 
normative context, which they [the scholars] construed as being defined by the 
persisting tensions between solidarist and pluralist visions – or, in Ayoob’s terms 
(2002), between Northern and Southern perspectives – of the international society/ 
global order. However, despite the relevance of previous analyses, some important 
questions are still left unanswered, to the detriment of our understanding of Russia’s 
peculiar discourse.  
First, a rigorous conceptualization of hegemony is missing from the somewhat 
uncritical categorization of the Western and Russian positions into the solidarist and 
pluralist camps. This problem is particularly acute considering the inconsistency 
between Russia’s approaches to sovereignty and military interventionism within and 
without the post-Soviet/ Near Abroad region. Certainly, it would be possible to identify 
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Russia’s opposition to the Eurocentric doctrine of humanitarian intervention and R2P 
in the ‘Far Abroad’ with the pluralist or counter/ anti-hegemonic views commonly 
articulated by non-Western and subaltern countries. However, Russia’s own hegemonic 
projects and invocations of R2P in the Near Abroad have often been neglected or 
subsumed into the counterhegemonic narrative of Moscow’s dissatisfactions with and 
efforts to reshape the existing international order. Among the analyses that were 
examined, Allison’s was an exception since he did recognize and devote a chapter in 
his book to explore the ‘dual’ nature of Russia’s normative projects. Even there, 
however, the issue of how the global and regional normative and hegemonic orders 
were created/ maintained in conjunction with each other was not adequately elucidated; 
Allison (2013: 207) suggested that while it is “hardly unique behavior for major powers 
with ambitions to manage their neighboring regions”, such a question “would require 
further research on the role of hegemons in different world regions and the possible 
emergence […] of ‘regional public orders’”.   
Another crucial issue (which I have noted earlier) is Allusion’s allusion to the 
‘hybrid norms’ which arose as the consequence of Russia’s efforts to maintain a dual 
normative order. Similarly, both Averre & Davies and Kuhrt have noted the hybridity 
in Russia’s normative challenges to Western liberal interventionism. For instance, 
although not explicitly employing the term ‘hybrid norms’, Averre and Davies (2015: 
828) argued, in a remarkable analogous manner, that the normative challenge to 
Western liberal interventionism that the Russian elites are trying to promote involves 
combining “traditional moral and spiritual values” as a source of political legitimacy 
with a vision of universality based on “pluralist policy positions or values”. However, 
they placed a greater emphasis on Moscow’s counter-hegemonic rhetoric pertaining to 
the ‘Far Abroad’ than on its deliberate misapplications of R2P in the ‘Near Abroad’. 
“What is concerning and disturbing…” in these cases, Kuhrt (2015: 111-112) wrote, 
“is the way in which Russia seeks to hold up a mirror to the West”, i.e. implying that 
these instances were problematic because they were spillovers of global normative 
struggles between Russia and the West. Such an approach to Russia’s discursive 
construction of the military interventions in Georgia and Ukraine, in my opinions, is 
inadequate. In any event, what I suggest is that the key to understand Russian ‘hybrid 
pluralist’ position and ‘hybrid norms’ lies, quite understandably, in unraveling the 
pervasiveness of the quality of ‘hybridity’ in Russia’s political discourses.  
24 
 
2.2. Russia’s Military Interventionism as a Hybrid Discourse: Postcolonial and 
Poststructuralist Perspectives 
For the reasons stated in the last subsection, I would argue that a theoretical 
framework informed by poststructuralist and postcolonial IR theories would be a 
valuable addition to the extant literature on Russia’s discourse of military 
interventionism, and that such a framework can be drawn from the emergent 
scholarship which undertook to incorporate the postcolonial theories into the field of 
Russian and post-communist studies (Morozov 2013, 2015; Moore 2001; Mignolo & 
Tlostanova 2012; Tlostanova 2009). Especially, the works of Morozov (2013, 2015) 
regarding Russia’s hybrid identity as a ‘subaltern empire’ are highly pertinent to the 
task of addressing the abovementioned lacuna, since they contain important insights 
about the hybrid nature of the modern Russian state, its foreign policy and the dual 
normative order that it seeks to promote/ maintain. According to this thesis, as a 
subaltern/ semi-periphery in a Eurocentric normative order, Russia has no alternative 
source of legitimacy and normativity to rely upon but the Western core’s – thus 
explaining the need to constantly appropriate ideas, images and practices of Europe/ the 
West, such as international peacekeeping and R2P. At the same time, the ruling class 
faces the daunting task of reconciling the country’s imperial legacy and core position 
in the post-Soviet space with its relatively marginalized position in the post-Cold War 
hegemonic order. Lacking viable normative alternatives with which to challenge the 
Western hegemonic order (Morozov 2015: 116), Russian elites eventually resorted to 
turning their mimicries away from the Eurocentric political imaginary and into 
articulations of Moscow’s postimperial-cum-subaltern agency to challenge the West’s 
normative and political hegemony – which according to Morozov, is equally 
Eurocentric. 
Underlying this approach is the understanding of hegemony as multilayered, 
according which a peripheral or semi-peripheral position in the global hegemonic order 
may coincide with a core position within a domestic and/ or regional hegemony 
(Morozov 2015: 64). Hegemony in the Gramscian sense represents “the idea of 
universalization of a particular socio-economic and normative order in a historical bloc” 
(Morozov 2015: 63). A hegemonic order inevitably engenders marginalization and 
subalternity, understood as a form of marginalization whereby subaltern social classes, 
due to their exclusion from the dominant system of political power, are derived of 
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proper and effective ‘voices’ to articulate their agencies (it should be noted that mere 
presence or belongingness of the subalterns in a certain hierarchy does not equal their 
inclusion into the dominant decision-making structure). But while neo-Gramscians are 
almost exclusively concerned with the global hegemonic order, postcolonial 
(Chakrabarty 2000; Spivak 1988, 1999) and poststructuralist (Laclau and Mouffe 1985) 
understandings of hegemony and subalternity allow us to entertain the idea of seeing 
the world as “structured by multiple hegemonies” (Morozov 2015: 64). Thus, Morozov 
(2015: 65) put forth the argument, which in certain ways parallels Allison’s concept of 
a dual (international and regional) normative order, that Russia has a “subaltern 
identity” vis-à-vis the Western global hegemony, but at the same time also possessing 
“an imperial identity, which takes pride […] in promoting the same hegemonic order 
among the native cultures, which occupy subaltern positions vis-à-vis the Russian 
imperial center”.  
According to postcolonial theory, any hegemonic order is characterized by the 
hybridity or co-constitutive nature of the identities of its constituting groups. The 
identities of the dominant groups and the subaltern groups, for instance, are intertwined. 
Counterhegemonic struggles are thus always part and parcel of the hegemony and 
destined to reproduce its logics (Morozov 2015: 64-65). As a subaltern in the 
Eurocentric hegemonic order, Russia’s counterhegemonic and pluralist challenges to 
the Western liberal normative order as described by Averre and Davies remain 
essentially trapped in/ conditioned by Western normative paradigms. Morozov (2015: 
128) succinctly put it: “a political action is only seen as legitimate if it is directed against 
the West (or at least demonstrates Russia’s independence from the West) and fits the 
‘universal’ norm (defined and upheld by Western hegemony) at the same time”.  
To gain a better understanding of Russia’s hybrid discourse of military 
interventionism, it would be necessary to engage with poststructuralist insights of how 
hegemony is constructed and contested discursively. According to poststructuralist 
discourse theory, meanings are established through relations (deference and difference) 
among signifiers and nodal points, which are privileged signifiers capable of assigning 
meanings to other signifiers in the chain of signification (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 112). 
Any discourse, then, is “the structured totality resulting from articulatory practices”, 
with articulations being the practices of establishing relations among signs (Laclau & 
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Mouffe 1985: 105). 11 From the point of view of poststructuralist discourse theory, 
hegemony is thus construed as “the expansion of a discourse, or set of discourses, into 
a dominant horizon of social orientation and action by means of articulating unfixed 
elements into partially fixed moments in a context crisscrossed by antagonistic forces” 
(Torfing 1999: 101, Rear & Jones 2013). In other words, a discourse becomes 
hegemonic when the social practices which are structured by it has been accepted by 
the majority as ‘self-evident’, ‘commonsensical’ and ‘objective’ (Rear & Jones 2013).  
Arguably, the evolution of international norms of humanitarian interventions 
and R2P resembled the abovementioned process. As constructivist scholars like 
Finnemore (1996, 2002), Wheeler (2006) and Barnett (2011) argued, the international 
normative context of the post-Cold War era was in no small part characterized by the 
ascendancy of international norms of human rights and humanitarian interventions. 
Indeed, after the Cold War, the use of military force to achieve humanitarian goals had 
gained currency among many politicians, activists, journalists and academics in the 
Global North. Among the reasons for such a development, we can identify factors such 
as the internationalization and internalization of human rights, embodied by the 
increasingly proactive mandate of the UN and growth in the number of human right 
NGOs; the globalization of media and communication which enabled public opinions 
in liberal democracies to be well-informed about humanitarian situations in virtually 
every countries (the ‘CNN effect’ comes to mind); and the prevailing anticipation of 
Western liberal democracy’s proliferation and ascendancy, of which the best-known 
articulation was ‘End of History’ theory proposed by F. Fukuyama (Hehir 2010: 1-6; 
Orford 2003: 2-5).  
And, because changes in international norms constitute the permissible 
conditions for changes in international political behaviors (Thakur & Weiss 2009), the 
ascendancy of international norms pertaining to humanitarian intervention also 
precipitated the emergence of ‘new’ or ‘humanitarian wars’. Indeed, assessing the 
impacts of NATO’s intervention in Yugoslavia, Joenniemi (2002) argued that the 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention had subverted the modern (Clausewitzian) 
discourse of war, thus necessitating the imposition of ‘humanitarian’ and ‘just war’ 
                                                           
11 It is worth noting that poststructuralism does not dispute the existence of a material reality – it only denies the 
existence of an extra-discursive social reality; whose meaning is accessible to our minds and yet independent of 
any discursive structure (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 107-108; Hansen 2006: 19-20).   
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narrative frames as the conditions for possibility for all subsequent ‘legitimate’ military 
interventions. Prominently featured in (or, in other words, constantly paid lip services 
to by) the official agendas of virtually all military interventions conducted ever since, 
international humanitarian norms also exert greater ‘shaming power’ through 
increasing public pressure on the governments of democratic regimes to punish gross 
violations of human rights by non-democratic regimes (Wheeler 2006: 39). Thus, in 
terms of poststructuralist discourse theory, the post-Cold War ascendancy of 
international humanitarian norms can be plausibly regarded as an instance whereby a 
discourse attained the status of ‘hegemonic’ by establishing a (partial) consensus on the 
permissibleness – if not the desirability – of international/ collective humanitarian 
interventions for addressing actual or potential crimes against humanity or 
humanitarian catastrophes.  
However, the domination of a hegemonic discourse over a field of discursivity 
“crisscrossed by antagonism” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 135) is neither permanent or 
complete; it is always “susceptible of being challenged by counter-hegemonic practices 
which attempt to disarticulate it in order to install another form of hegemony” (Mouffe 
2008: 4, Rear & Jones 2013). In this sense, I can concur with Averre & Davies that 
Russia’s articulations constituted such a strand of counter-/antihegemonic discursive 
practices. However, Russia’s counterhegemonic discourses cannot introduce new nodal 
points to disarticulate the West’s discourse of liberal humanitarianism, because as 
argued by Morozov (2015: 65), Russia’s normative nodal points continue to be defined 
externally by the Eurocentric hegemony. So, unlike the anti-Western projects 
articulated by non-Western states like Venezuela, Iran or North Korea, Russia’s 
counterhegemonic discourses do not offer a genuine alternative to the European/ 
Western hegemony.  Rather, Russian elites engaged in acts of mimicry which 
simultaneously reproduce and (potentially) subvert the discourses of the hegemon. 
With regards to the discourse of military interventionism, such hybrid articulations are 
designed to link the signifiers of Russian interventions to nodal points previously 
established by the hegemonic discourse, such as humanitarian intervention, 
counterterrorism and R2P. These nodal points hence would become ‘floating signifiers’ 
(prone to competing interpretations) in the struggle for hegemony between these 
[Russia’s and the West’s] discourses (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 22). 
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An example of mimicry can be found, for instance, in Russian-style 
international peacekeeping operations and invocations of R2P on which I touched in 
the previous section. Arguably, Russia’s military interventions in the early 90s and 
subsequently for the most part occurred as spontaneous and forcible reactions to the 
political and military entropies brought about by the USSR’s disintegration. However, 
by seeking to justify them as exercises in international peacekeeping, the post-Soviet 
Russian leadership effectively acknowledged the Western-led normative order as the 
new conditions of possibility for the fledgling Russian state’s military interventions, 
replacing the obsolescent discourse of ‘socialist internationalism’ (which was the basis 
of the Soviet Union’s Brezhnev’s Doctrine). As Stuenkel (2014: 12-13) noted, Russian 
officials’ decision to invoke R2P to justify the military intervention in Georgia also 
demonstrated that Moscow, in principle at least, accepted the idea that violations of 
sovereignty can be justified under the terms of international humanitarian norms. 
Although the subaltern can “mimic, distort or even invert the dominant norm”, its acts 
of mimicry cannot “establish any moral authority […] that would not need the Master’s 
sanction to be credible” (Morozov 2015: 129). The issue of moral authority surfaced in 
Russia’s limited successes in procuring the endorsements of CIS members for its 
regional normative and integration projects. Here, I am inclined to concur with 
Allison’s remark (2013: 170) that Moscow has “no realistic prospect of challenging 
Western states in solidarity with some CIS or Eurasian group of states over the law and 
norms regulating the legitimate use of force”. Borrowing Bhabha’s well-known 
expression about colonial hybridity (Bhabha 1994: 86), Russia’s discursive 
construction of military interventionism can be described as “almost the same, but not 
quite” in its aspirations to either imitate or subvert the hegemonic discourse of 
humanitarian intervention and R2P. 
In the final analysis, the insights of postcolonial and poststructuralist theories 
presented above should make a compelling case that Russia’s discourses of military 
intervention and R2P are, in fact, hybrid or Janus-faced (a term used by Tlostanova:  
2008)– as they are symptomatic of Russia’s hybrid condition (consisting of both 
subaltern and imperial traits). In other words, whilst seeking to justify the country’s 
military interventions in the Near Abroad, Russian politicians and diplomats must 
repeatedly invoke legal arguments, claims and rhetoric in terms almost identical to 
those articulated by their Western counterparts. As a corollary, it would be possible to 
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read Russia’s official discourses/ narratives of its military interventions in the Near 
Abroad simultaneously as equivalent and distorted versions of the Western discourses 
of humanitarian intervention/ R2P. Taking this into account, the next section of the 
dissertation will present a poststructuralist analytical framework with an eye to 
examining the discursive construction of Russia’s military interventions regarding the 
cases of military interventions in Georgia and Ukraine.  
3. Applying the Poststructuralist Analytical Framework  
In designing the empirical analysis part, I also depart from the norm-oriented 
constructivist framework, which foregrounds subjective/ inter-subjective beliefs about 
the permissibility/ legitimacy of humanitarian intervention, and adopt a poststructuralist 
analytical framework – in the light of which justifications for military intervention are 
analyzed as part of the continuous (re)production of binary oppositions essential to the 
constitution of Subjectivity (Malmvig 2006). According to this approach, far from mere 
expressions of pre-existing identities and national interests, discourses are the sites on 
which ‘identities’ and ‘interests’ are constituted and articulated, the sites on which 
‘subjectivity’ is produced (Campbell 1998: 1, Doty 1996: 5). In the words of Foucault 
(1981), “discourse is not simply that which translates struggles or systems of 
domination, but is the thing for which and by which there is struggle, discourse is the 
power which is to be seized”. The objective of a poststructuralist analysis, hence, is not 
to uncover the pre-existing material or ideational factors behind representations, but 
rather to “examine how certain representations underlie the production of knowledge 
and identities and how these representations make various courses of action possible” 
(Doty 1996: 5), i.e. interrogating how discourses, articulations and representations (in 
the form of textual data) create the international reality upon which foreign policies can 
be made. 
 From a poststructuralist perspective, the use of force in international politics – 
instead of being a product of an anarchical international system – is an essential mean 
for states to constitute and perpetuate themselves (Heihir 2010: 76). To put it 
differently, violence and the state are mutually constitutive, as the use of force is the 
conditions of possibility of and, at the same time, enabled by sovereignty (Malmvig 
2006: 38). As Edkins (2003) argued, humanitarianism is part of “the politics of drawing 
lines, that is, the politics of producing the sovereign state” – far from undermining 
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political dominance and sovereignty, it often reinforces them. Hence, the question of 
how post-Cold War military interventionism, in the shapes of humanitarianism, R2P or 
the war of Terror, simultaneously produce and are produced by the demarcations 
between inside/ outside, domestic/ international and Self/ Other has been a focal point 
of poststructuralist IR scholarship (Zehfuss 2013: 154). Following this approach, the 
subsequent analytical part aims to elucidate the construction of different Self/ Other 
binaries in Russia’s discourses and examine how they resembled or distorted the 
hegemonic discourses of humanitarian intervention and R2P. 
To facilitate the analytical process, I also incorporate into the current study the 
analytical strategy of reading justifications of military intervention as heroic narratives, 
which was proposed by critical international law scholar Anne Orford. Interventionist 
discourses, according to Orford, often serve to obscure the extent to which the Subject 
of interventions (i.e. those claiming to act on behalf of the imagined international 
community) have contributed, politically and economically, to the emergence of 
humanitarian crises (Orford 2003: 158-159). From this critical standpoint, the binary 
decision that the international community is prompted to make – of action and inaction, 
or more poignantly, to save or to abandon innocent lives – is not at all a genuine 
decision, because the international community is already partly responsible for 
engendering the inhumane conditions that it attempts to relieve (ibid: 1-39). Crucially, 
Orford argued that despite conspicuously international focus of legal justifications of 
humanitarian intervention, they function effectively as instruments of identification on 
domestic and personal levels, shaping the public’s views through the dissemination of 
humanitarian intervention narratives in mass media (ibid: 11). Accounting for the 
pervasive effects of legal discourses of interventionism, Orford employed the concept 
of interpellation – which she drew from Althusser’s structuralist theory of ideology and 
complemented with feminist and postcolonial insights – to indicate the process by 
which “narrative operates to shape the subjectivity of the members of the audience” 
through identification with the characters along “gendered lines” as well as “racial 
differentiation” (ibid: 161). The heroic narrative – which transforms the Subject of 
humanitarian intervention into a white and masculine savior, a “knight in white armor” 




This type of storyline often begins with an interruption to the established order, 
like a civil war, ethnic-cleansing or genocide in a Third World country or a particularly 
devastating terrorist attack in a First World country, and concludes with a full or partial 
restoration of the disrupted order (take, for example, president Bush’s “Mission 
Accomplished” speech) due to the intervener’s selfless efforts and sacrifices (ibid: 163-
165, 177-180). Between the two events, the world of an interventionist narrative is 
populated with imagines of devastated landscapes, helpless civilians, violated female 
bodies and maniacal authoritarians/ terrorists, which together set the stage for the 
Subject’s heroic exploits (ibid: 171-175). Intervening in this chaotic situation, the 
heroic protagonist is endowed with symbols of progressiveness, civilization, power and 
masculinity vis-à-vis the backwardness, barbarism, impotency and effeminacy of the 
Others whom the protagonist must either rescue (the civilians) or punish (the enemies 
of human rights and democracy) to restore the symbolic order (ibid: 165-171). By 
identifying with the Subject, the spectators can experience the freedom and agency of 
the hero, thereby facilitating their own (re)interpellation into subject positions favorable 
to the hegemonic order (ibid: 171). 
Arguably, the characters (the hero, the villain and the helpless victims) in 
Orford’s analysis of intervention narrative can be understood as concretizations of the 
categories of the Self/ Other found in other poststructuralist analyses of foreign policy 
(Campbell 1992, Doty 1996, Hansen 2006). From a poststructuralist perspective, 
foreign policy (of which military interventionism is a vital component) is essentially a 
practice of (re)producing boundaries between inside/ outside, internal/ external and 
Self/ Other that constitute the conditions of possibility for identity discourses (Campbell 
1992: 69). Similarly, Doty (1996: 10) argued that representational practices concerning 
global politics “simultaneously construct the ‘other’, which is often ostensibly the 
object of various practices, and also importantly construct the ‘self’ vis-à-vis this 
‘other’”. Furthermore, the Subject/ Object binary of intervention narratives can be 
understood in terms of the dialectical processes of linking (positive identification) and 
differentiation (negative identification) which are part and parcel of the discursive 
construction of identity (Hansen 2006: 17-18); for instance, interventionary narratives 
associate the heroic Subject with attributes like progressiveness, civilization, power and 
masculinity while imagine the Others as backward, uncivilized, powerless and feminine 
objects (as illustrated in Figure 1). Hence, it is not unreasonable for to re-articulate 
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Orford’s framework of humanitarian intervention narrative in the more familiar 
categories of poststructuralist foreign policy analysis; which, as Hansen (2016: 96) 
succinctly summarized, including “representations of the countries, places, and people 
that such [foreign] policies are assisting or deterring, as well as […] representation of 
the national or institutional self that undertakes these policies”, i.e. the Other and the 
Self. 
 
Figure 1: Processes of Linking and Differentiation in the Construction of the Subject/ Object Binary in 
Humanitarian Intervention Narratives 
 
Additionally, while other analyses of foreign policy and/ or critical security tend 
to group representations of “countries, places and people” into a single category of “the 
Other”, I would prefer to use the term “imaginative geographies” to denote forms of 
geographical, cartographic and spatial representation in humanitarian intervention 
discourses. This concept was originally developed by Edward Said in his critical 
analysis of Orientalism (Said 1978, Gregory 2009: 370), and had ever since entered the 
core vocabularies of a variety of fields in social sciences and the humanities. Here, 
imaginative geographies can be defined as representations of ‘own’ and ‘other’ places 
which form the geographical background for the interactions between the Self/ Subject 
and the Other/ Object, and that convey the Subject’s desires and fantasies as well as 
power asymmetries between the Subject and the Other (Gregory 2009: 369-371). By 
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affirming ideas about ‘near’ and ‘far’, ‘our’ and ‘foreign lands’, imaginative 
geographies contribute not only to the production of Otherness but also to the Subject’s 
self-identification (ibid; Orford 2003: 82-124). 
Regarding the selection of texts, the dissertation concerns empirically with 
Moscow’s official (presidential and government) discourses pertaining to the two cases. 
Specifically, the selected texts are speeches, statements, interviews and articles given/ 
written with the purpose of justifying Moscow’s actions by top Russian officials, 
namely President Medvedev (in the case of the Russo-Georgian War), Prime Minister/ 
President Putin, Foreign Minister Lavrov and the late Russian Ambassador to the UN, 
Vitaly Churkin. While the timeframe for collecting textual data would normally be 
restricted to the period between the start and conclusion of the military intervention 
(when the development of the main narrative can be tracked), in reality this approach 
is only feasible for the case of Russia’s military intervention in South Ossetia/ Georgia 
in 2008. For this case, I choose 08 August 2008 (when President Medvedev issued his 
first official statement regarding the situation in South Ossetia) and 31 August 2008 
(when Medvedev unveiled his eponymous doctrine) as the starting and end dates of the 
analytical timeframe respectively. For Moscow’s interventions in Ukraine, I delimit the 
time periods for collecting and reading texts based on slightly different criteria. Because 
the Moscow’s involvement – the scale of which is still not officially disclosed – is still 
an ongoing affair, I decide to limit the corresponding analysis to the period between 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea (beginning with Putin’s speech on 18 March 2014) to 
the Minsk II Agreement in February 2015. Finally, while the military adventure in Syria 
might have inaugurated a new trajectory for Moscow’s interventionism beyond the 
Near Abroad (Leonard 2016), the contemporaneity and complex nature of the Syrian 
conflict, e.g. the number of involved parties, their respective (and often shifting) 
policies, the symbolic and geopolitical significance of the Levant, etc. deter the attempt 
to give an analysis of Russia’s Syrian intervention within the confines of this study. It 
should be noted, regardless, that the framework of this dissertation is intended to be 
applicable as well to other instances of Russian discursive construction of 
interventionism, including that of the intervention in Syria.  
As my empirical analysis mainly engages with Russia’s official discourse of 
justification for military intervention, it will inevitably leave out the academic, wider 
social and marginal (oppositional) political discourses. However, such a limitation is 
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understandable, because I do not aim to map the whole discursive field pertaining to 
Russia’s foreign interventions nor to distinguish between the official and marginal 
political discourses. Such objectives would require a much more encompassing and 
throughout investigation which is simply not practical for the level of a master 
dissertation. Rather, in designing this analytical framework, I follow the 
methodological approach of Helle Malmvig (2006: 24), who argues that “discourses do 
not exist prior to our investigations of them”, and hence there are no given rules 
dictating how particular discourses should be analyzed. As opposed to positivist 
methodologies, a poststructuralist analytical framework is neither a mean “to test 
poststructuralist approaches” nor “a way to furnish a set of universal criteria upon which 
poststructuralist work can be evaluated” (ibid), but should rather provide a guideline 
“to structure that large body of textual material” with which the study engages. As such, 
the choices that I make regarding the division of the examined discourses into three 
analytical categories as well as the selection of texts are but several in an infinite 
number of research designs and analytical strategies that could be hypothetically 
employed. I also do not endeavor to test or falsify the validity of the postcolonial theory-
inspired assumption about Russia’s hybrid ‘subaltern empire’ status – such a task would 
also require a different theoretical and methodological framework – but rather to 
demonstrate its pertinence to our understanding of Russia’s military interventionism  
and its hybridity in juxtaposition to the Western hegemonic discourses of humanitarian 





III. IMAGINATIVE GEOGRAPHIES AND GEOPOLITICAL IMAGINARY 
In this chapter, I argue that the analysis of imaginative geographies can be 
applied to the production of the imaginative ‘post-Soviet’/ ‘Near Abroad’ space in 
Russia’s discourse of military interventionism, and that Russia’s imaginative 
geographies bore similarities as well as differences in comparison to those of the post-
Cold War hegemonic discourse of humanitarianism. Based on the analysis of official 
texts, I identify two major forms of geographical and geopolitical representations that 
Russia’s discourses of military interventionism had employed to make sense of military 
interventions in Georgia and Ukraine: the former pertains to representations of the 
locations of Russia’s military interventions and foregrounds the geopolitical narrative 
of a Russo-centric ‘Near Abroad’ region, while the latter involved framing Russian 
military actions as counter-hegemonic moves aimed to challenge the West’ post-Cold 
War geopolitical dominance. 
1. Imaginative Geographies of the Near Abroad 
In the age of liberal interventionism and R2P, the legitimacy of military 
interventions is contingent upon the idea of sovereignty as a responsibility, and only 
states that manifestly fail to perform their perceived responsibilities to the populations 
can become potential targets for external interventions. Representational practices 
pertaining to imaginative geographies are therefore essential to the discursive 
production of the territories wherein humanitarian interventions take place. More often 
than not, such representational practices function by reproducing colonial Orientalist 
stereotypes, wherein countries at the receiving end of the interventions are imagined as 
not only geographically remote and backward but also morally distinct from the 
interveners (O’Tuathail 1996: 170).  
In Russia’s official discourses, the Georgian and Ukrainian states were similarly 
treated as failed states plagued by internal conflicts and lacking the capacity (as well as 
the will) to protect the populations – many of whom were also Russian citizens or 
Russian speakers. In the official discourse on Georgia/ South Ossetia, for instance, 
Georgia was discursively represented as a country suffering from its government’s 
nationalistic and belligerent policies. The links between South Ossetia (and by 
extension Abkhazia) and Georgia was deliberately kept vague: on the one hand, the 
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discourse occasionally indicated South Ossetia to be a part of Georgia in order to accuse 
the Georgian government of crimes against its own people; on the other hand, South 
Ossetians were frequently referred to as a distinct people whose closeness to the 
Russian nation separated them from Georgia proper (Lavrov 12.08.2008, Medvedev 
26.08.2008). In the case of Ukraine, the post-Maidan Ukrainian state also appeared in 
the Russian discourse as a failed and backward state ruled by corrupt officials and 
ultranationalists who favored the use of violence to achieve their political goals, 
bringing into mind a chaotic and devastated landscape similar to those constructed by 
other interventionist narratives (Putin 18.03.2014, 17.04.2014; Orford 2003: 171-175). 
Lavrov, for example, simulated such a landscape of chaos and violence in his 
description of Ukraine: 
“… A coup d'état supported by external forces has taken place in the country, 
which is fraternal for Russia. Anarchy is continuing, actions of national 
radicals, anti-Semites and other extremists, on which the new powers are based, 
are fixed every day. Real threats to life and the safety of people, everyday cases 
of violence, gross and mass violation of human rights in Ukraine, including 
discrimination and persecution due to nationality, language and political 
convictions…” (Lavrov 20.03.2014) 
The most salient geopolitical representations employed by Russia’s discourse 
of military interventionism, however, involved the continuous reaffirmation of the 
‘Near Abroad’ geopolitical imaginary and the inclusion of intervened territories in this 
imaginative geographical space. Geopolitics has been frequently evoked by both 
Russian and Western scholars to explain Russia’s motivation for military intervention 
in the Near Abroad (for example Allison 2015: 1269-1282; Auer 2015; Gotz 2016; 
Karaganov 2014; Mearsheimer 2014; Sakwa 2016; Trenin 2014a). Here, I understand 
‘geopolitics’ in terms of geo-political discourses and representational practices, the 
purpose of which is to explain and justify foreign policy (Mäkinen 2016: 95, Laruelle 
2015). Across the examined discourses, the ‘Near Abroad’ was employed as a 
geographical nodal point to which the geopolitical significance of Russia’s military 
interventions can be partially fixed – in the official articulation, it generally came to 
denote the post-Soviet region wherein the Russian nation had a traditional military and 
political presences as well as vital long-term interests. By demarcating the boundaries 
between the Near Abroad and the ‘Far Abroad’, the official discourse distinguished the 
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military actions taken by Russia within the former from its opposition to the West’s 
humanitarian interventions in the latter – thus exhibiting the dual nature of the 
geopolitical imaginary in Russia’s humanitarian intervention discourse.  
In the case of Georgia, Russia’s military intervention and subsequent 
recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia’s independence provided the Russian 
leadership with the opportunity to articulate the idea of a Russo-centric geopolitical 
sphere in the Near Abroad – i.e. the so-called ‘Medvedev Doctrine’. Such an 
articulation involved, on the one hand, grounding Russia’s claims on highly simplified 
narratives of history and identity, which represented Russia as the historical guarantor 
and provider of security of the people in the Caucasus. On the other, it involved the 
linking the Russian Self’s vital interests to the Near Abroad nodal point, thereby fixing 
the meaning of the region as a geopolitical space with ontological significance to the 
Self (Medvedev 08.08.2008, 12.08.2008, 31.08.2008).  
Similarly, representation of historico-geographical bonds between Russia and 
its neighborhood and the region’s geopolitical importance to Russia also played a 
fundamental role in the signification of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and (tacit) 
military supports to the Donbas insurgency. In the case of Crimea, the historical 
dimension was foregrounded and mythicized to evoke a sense of organic, cultural and 
civilizational togetherness between Russia and the Crimean Peninsula and Sevastopol 
(Putin 18.03.2014). In terms of geo-strategic significance, the discourse emphasized the 
importance of Sevastopol as the base of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, and the prospect of 
Ukraine becoming a member of NATO thus posed a pressing security threat to the 
Russian Self (Putin 17.04.2014). Such an imaginary was put quite succinctly by Putin 
himself in an interview with Radio Europe 1 and TF1 TV channel: “we could not allow 
a historical part of the Russian territory with a predominantly ethnic Russian 
population to be incorporated into an international military alliance, especially 
because Crimeans wanted to be part of Russia” (Putin 04.06.2014). In geo-economic 
terms, the discourse also articulated the view that the Association Agreement between 
the EU and Ukraine would detrimentally affected the economic relations between 
Moscow and Kiev (Putin 24.10.2014). With regards to the conflicts in Donbas, the 
official discourse attempted to link Eastern Ukraine to the briefly resurrected 
geopolitical imaginary of Novorossiya (New Russia) – an administrative region which 
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dated back to the Russian Empire – as evidenced by Putin’s remark during his Direct 
Line session in April 2014:  
“I would like to remind you that what was called Novorossiya (New Russia) 
back in the tsarist days – Kharkov, Lugansk, Donetsk, Kherson, Nikolayev and 
Odessa – were not part of Ukraine back then. These territories were given to 
Ukraine in the 1920s by the Soviet government. Why? Who knows. They were won 
by Potemkin and Catherine the Great in a series of well-known wars. The centre of 
that territory was Novorossiysk, so the region is called Novorossiya. Russia lost 
these territories for various reasons, but the people remained” (Putin 17.04.2014).  
To sum up, the section argued that the imaginative geographies pertaining to the 
Near Abroad in Russia’s military interventions on the one hand articulated the objects 
of Russia’s interventions (Georgia and Ukraine) as chaotic and backward landscapes in 
the language of humanitarianism, but on the other hand also associated the territories 
in question with the Self’s ontological security. Through these links, the official 
discourse not only represented these countries and territories as legitimate targets for 
external humanitarian intervention but also sought to naturalize the Russia Self’s claims 
to exclusive right to intervene in them.  
2. Russia’s Counter-Hegemonic Imaginative Geographies  
Another important facet of Russia’s imaginative geographies involved the 
global imaginary based on which Russian official discourses construe the global 
implications of its military interventions. Generally, the section argues that in contrast 
with the liberal geopolitical imaginaries of post-Cold War humanitarianism, Russia’s 
intervention narratives traced the country’s military interventions in Georgia and 
Ukraine back to its counter-hegemonic geopolitical imaginary (Gregory 2009: 371). 
While liberal humanitarianism premised a non-Western world in need of the West’ 
assistances to advance toward universal values such as democracy and human rights, 
the Russian geopolitical imaginary on the contrary identified the liberal and anti-
Russian geopolitical ambitions of the West (manifested in the expansion of NATO and 
the enlargement of the EU) as the causes of the humanitarian crises and global 
instability that the Russian Self must address. Through such imaginary, the military 
interventions in Georgia and Ukraine assumed new dimensions of meaning as 
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‘criticisms by weapons’ of the unjust dominance and misuse of the discourse of 
humanitarianism of the Western hegemon.  
In the case of Georgia, the counter-hegemonic imaginative geographies of 
Russia’s discourse involved criticism of the West’s military and political supports for 
Georgia, which was explained as originating from its ‘Cold War’ mentality and 
unwarranted ambitions toward Russia’s neighborhood (Putin 11.08.2008). Georgian’s 
aggressive policies was portrayed as being conducted against the background of 
NATO’s offering of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Georgia in early 2008, 
which was depicted by Lavrov as “anti-Russian policy, supporting an aggressive 
regime in Georgia” (Lavrov 19.08.2008).  The West/ NATO was also criticized for not 
for its geopolitical double standard and the discrepancy in its invocations of 
humanitarian norms. For instance, in his speech in Vladikavkaz, Putin drew a 
comparison between the atrocities committed by Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the 
destruction caused by Georgia – which he described as more appalling – in an effort to 
ridicule the disparate applications of humanitarian norms by U.S. authorities:    
“But, of course, Saddam Hussein had to be hanged for destroying 
several Shiite villages. And the present Georgian leadership, who have simply 
wiped out ten Ossetian villages from the face of this planet, whose tanks were 
running over children and old men, who have burned civilians alive in sheds - 
these people, certainly, had to be taken under protection. If I am not mistaken, 
Ronald Reagan once said about a Latin American dictator: "Somoza is a 
bastard, but he is our bastard. And we will help him, we will protect him."” 
(Putin 11.08.2008) 
Russia’s counter-hegemonic geopolitical imaginary in the context of Russia’s 
military intervention in Georgia was articulated most succinctly in Medvedev’s 
interview with Channel One on 31 August 2008. Here, alongside a Near Abroad’s 
‘sphere of privileged interests’, Medvedev also expressed Russia’s desire for a multi-
polar world. A unipolar international system with the U.S. at its head was seen as 
unacceptable and cited the source of instability and conflict: 
 “… The world should be multi-polar. A single-pole world is 
unacceptable. Domination is something we cannot allow. We cannot accept a 
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world order in which one country makes all the decisions, even as serious and 
influential a country as the United States of America. Such a world is unstable 
and threatened by conflict.” (Medvedev 31.08.2008) 
In the case of Ukraine, the Russian narrative framed the annexation of Crimea 
in the context of a geopolitical-historical narrative, centering around three key events: 
Nikita Khrushchev’s decision to transfer the Crimean Peninsula along with Sevastopol 
to Ukraine in 1954, the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the Euromaidan 
crisis in Ukraine in 2013-2014 (Putin 18.03.2014; Churkin 31.03.2014). Each of these 
three events constitutes an equivalent of a ‘disruption’ to the symbolic order, which the 
hero of the intervention narrative must seek to undo. For instance, both Putin’s and 
Churkin’s speeches depicted the transfer of Crimea and Sevastopol to Ukraine as an 
‘illegal’, ‘unconstitutional’ and ‘voluntaristic’ decision that contradicted the entire 
historical course of the Russian nation. This ‘historical injustice’ was further 
exacerbated when Crimea was “cut off “alive” from Russia” (Churkin 31.03.2014) and 
the Crimean people were “handed over like a sack of potatoes” (Putin 18.03.2014) in 
1991, and in 2014, when the political upheaval in Kyiv threatened to unleash the forces 
of Ukrainian neo-Nazism and ultranationalism onto ethnic Russians living in Ukraine. 
Thus, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov depicted the Russian Self as facing an 
urgent choice  
“…dictated by the entire history of our modern day life, international law, 
Russian national identity, our responsibility for the destinies of those Russians 
who found themselves abroad in a flash as a result of procedures, which did not 
correspond to international legal procedures…” (Lavrov 30.03.2014) 
Furthermore, the discourse presented the last two events in this historical 
sequence as being accompanied by even more perilous and sinister geopolitical 
developments of a global magnitude – namely the collapse of the bipolar global order 
and the ensuing unipolar global disorder. In the Russian narrative, this type of 
disruptions, whilst resembling the instabilities and violence of the post-Cold War era 
that were evoked to rationalize the Eurocentric discourse of military interventionism 
(Orford 2003: 162-163), was construed as inevitable consequences of the West’s 
exceptionalism and geopolitical ambitions – instead of being the works of “rouge states, 
ruthless dictators and ethnic tensions” (ibid: 163) as in the Western discourses. Thus, 
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echoing his 2007 speech in Munich, Putin’s speech on the eve of the annexation 
provided a tour d'horizon of how the Ukrainian crisis originated in the post-Cold War 
political development: 
“Like a mirror, the situation in Ukraine reflects what is going on and what has 
been happening in the world over the past several decades. After the dissolution 
of bipolarity on the planet, we no longer have stability. […] Our western 
partners, led by the United States of America, prefer not to be guided by 
international law in their practical policies, but by the rule of the gun. They 
have come to believe in their exclusivity and exceptionalism, that they can 
decide the destinies of the world, that only they can ever be right. They act as 
they please: here and there, they use force against sovereign states, building 
coalitions based on the principle “If you are not with us, you are against us.” 
To make this aggression look legitimate, they force the necessary resolutions 
from international organizations, and if for some reason this does not work, 
they simply ignore the UN Security Council and the UN overall” (Putin 
18.03.2014) 
Furthermore, it is implied in Putin’s speech that the decision to admit Crimea 
and Sevastopol into the Russian Federation was consequential for Russia as well as the 
non-Western world, because it proved that peripheral countries were “ independent 
participants” in international affairs whose national interests must be “taken into 
account and respected” notwithstanding the core’s objections (Putin 18.03.2014). 
Likewise, Lavrov (07.04.2014) conjured a pedagogical metaphor to convey Russian 
counter-hegemonic message: “The world of today is not a junior school where teachers 
assign punishments at will”.  
Throughout the crisis in Eastern Ukraine, Russia’s counter-hegemonic 
geopolitical imaginary continued to be evoked in order to make sense of Russia’s 
interventionist policy. Putin’s speech at the Valdai Forum later in 2014 offered a fine 
example of this continuation (Putin 24.10.2014). In this speech, Putin articulated 
another sweeping narrative of geopolitical development since the end of the Cold War, 
which in his view had led to the erosion of “the current system of global and regional 
security”, making the world considerably less safe and more volatile. Once again, the 
triumphalism of Western states after the collapse of the Soviet Union was identified as 
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the root cause of the global disorder – the proliferation of ethnic conflicts and extremist 
groups (such as Islamic terrorists and neo-fascists) in the periphery was traced back to 
the West’s disdain for national sovereignty and efforts to impose their wills and models 
of development – without the UNSC’s sanctions – on other countries. The current crisis 
in Ukraine was then construed as a symptom of this global disorder, as “a result of a 
misbalance in international relations”. Against this chaotic geopolitical backdrop stood 
the Russian Self as a bastion of stability and moderation; Russia was depicted as seeking 
neither world leadership nor superpower status (“We don’t need to be a superpower; 
this would only be an extra load for us”), but merely the redress of its grievances and 
the establishment of a proper functioning global system – a system founded on the 
norms of international law (especially sovereign equality), interdependence among 
different regions of the world and respects for the legitimate interests of all countries.  
To sum up, the analysis of Russia’s imaginative geographies and geopolitical 
imaginaries presented in this chapter demonstrated that there were structural similarities 
as well as differences between the ways the Russian and hegemonic discourses of 
military interventionism were constructed. On the one hand, like liberal 
interventionism’s narratives, Russian intervention narratives viewed the objects of its 
military interventions, Georgia and Ukraine, under imperialistic lenses. Through these 
lenses, the two countries as well as the territories under contestation appeared as vital 
components of the ‘Near Abroad’ post-imperial geopolitical imaginary. At the same 
time, due to Russia’s fundamental hybridity, articulations of Russian geopolitical 
imaginary also linked its imperial reflexes with the subaltern dreams of challenging the 
geopolitical domination of the Western hegemon. The two sides of Russia’s 
imaginative geographies – the post-imperial and subaltern imaginaries – reinforced 
rather than cancelled out each other, as Russia’s military interventions were rationalized 
simultaneously on the ground of defending its vital interests and historical role within 
the Near Abroad and as the manifestation of Russia’s counter-hegemonic aspiration to 
challenge the Eurocentric hegemonic order. 
IV. THE OTHERS OF RUSSIAN HEROIC INTERVENTION NARRATIVE  
1. The Antagonistic Others: Representations of the West and Georgian/ 
Ukrainian Others 
The role of the Other or ‘Others’ in the formation of Russian identity and foreign 
policy has been studied extensively by IR scholars following constructivist and 
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poststructuralist approaches (for example, see Tsygankov 2012, 2015; Hopf 2015, 
2016; Neumann 2016). Among other things, this scholarly discourse generally 
established representations of Europe/ the West as the most significant form of 
Otherness informing debates on national identity and foreign policy among both the 
Russian elites and public (Morozov 2017). For instance, Tsygankov (2013: 17) argued 
that the West “played the role of the significant Other and prominently figured in 
debates about national identity” and is “the key point of reference” of Russian foreign 
policy discourses. Therefore, as an integral part of foreign policy, Russian discourse of 
military intervention naturally would replicate the dichotomy between the Russian Self 
and the Western/ European Other found elsewhere.  
Yet, according to Hansen (2006: 36), the foregrounding of a single Self/ Other 
duality could be counterproductive, as the Other is usually located in an intricate ‘web 
of identities’ that involves various degrees of Otherness as well as multiple Others. 
Similarly, Orford’s conception of the narrative of military interventionism – as 
described in the previous section – suggests that such a narrative must put together a 
‘cast’ of various characters to sustain valid Objects for the intervener’s heroic quest. 
Informed by these assumptions, the current analysis elected to depart from previous 
studies and locate in the Russian discourse different representations of the Others that 
can fulfill the prescribed roles as either ‘antagonists’ or ‘sufferers’ of the humanitarian 
intervention story.  
1.1.Representations of the Western Other  
 In the official discourse of the military intervention in South Ossetia, the 
Western Other was discursively constructed as partly responsible – though indirectly – 
for engendering the crisis that required the Russian Self’s heroic intervention. At times, 
however, the offical discourse did portray certain Western leaders and officials (such 
as those of Finland, France or the EU and OSCE) quite positively. For instance, 
France’s President Sarkozy were commended for brokering the ceasefire agreement 
between Russia and Georgia (Lavrov 12.08.2008; Medvedev 12.08.2008). Some of the 
texts also cast positive lights on the EU and OSCE for these organizations’ perceived 
cooperation and understanding. Additionally, at the very beginning of Russia’s military 
intervention, references to the roles of the West were mostly neutral in tones or even 
avoided entirely, as in the case of President Medvedev’s first offical statement 
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regarding the situation in South Ossetia on 08 August (Medvedev 08.08.2008). 
Lavrov’s statement on the same day also included only passing mentions of the 
European Union and Russia’s ‘European & American colleagues’ (when he stated that 
Georgian aggression was being carried out “against the background of the flag of the 
European Union” and that the West would “understand what is happening” and support 
Russia’s rightful military actions) (Lavrov 08.08.2008). Similarly, in his speech in 
Vladikavkaz on the next day, Putin only alluded to Tbilisi’s desire to become a member 
of NATO, which according to him was pursued in order to “involve other countries and 
peoples in its bloody adventures” (Putin 09.08.2008). 
However, as the military intervention progressed, attitudes toward the West 
were increasingly characterized by frustrations over the unwillingness of Western 
capitals – especially Washington – to recognize Tbilisi’s ‘war crimes’ as well as the 
legitimacy of Moscow’s R2P-based military intervention. Negative representations of 
the West were articulated, for example, in Putin’s opening remarks at a government 
meeting on 11 August, wherein the then Prime Minister criticized ‘Western partners’ 
for not giving heed to Moscow’s previous warnings about Tbilisi’s belligerence, thus 
holding them partially responsible for their client state’s aggressive behaviors (Putin 
11.08.2008).  Echoing Putin’s criticisms, Lavrov (12.08.2008) also apportioned the 
blame on Western countries and specifically the U.S.: “What happened in South Ossetia 
lies, to a significant extent, on their [the Western states’] conscience as well […] Our 
US partners gave assurances to us that they would not allow the Georgian army trained 
by them to be used to solve problems in the conflict zones. Obviously, they failed to keep 
Mikhail Saakashvili from the temptation to solve all his problems by way of war”. From 
there onward, negative images of the U.S. government and NATO were evoked more 
frequently, occasionally supplemented by favorable descriptions of European leaders 
like Sarkozy or organizations like the EU and OSCE. The examined texts showed that 
Russian officials explicitly attributed the blame for engendering the crisis, through 
politically and militarily assisting Saakashvili’s regime, on the U.S. government and its 
allies. NATO as a whole was openly criticized for pursuing ‘anti-Russia’ policy and 
aiding Georgia’s militaristic agenda – Lavrov, for example, remarked that “NATO is 
trying to make a victim of an aggressor and whitewash a criminal regime” and “it's Mr. 
Saakashvili telling advanced democracies such as NATO countries what they should 
do to satisfy his ambitions” (Lavrov 19.08.2008). 
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Not only holding the West partially liable for Georgia’s actions, Russian 
discourse also sought to rebut Western governments’ criticisms of Russia’s R2P-based 
justifications by bringing up ethical and legal issues regarding previous military 
interventions and framing them as examples of the West’s double standard and 
exceptionalism. In his Vladikavkaz’s speech, for instance, Putin acrimoniously 
denounced the ‘surprising level of cynicism’ of the American government, which prior 
to speech helped transporting Georgian contingents from Iraq “directly into the conflict 
zone” in Georgia (Putin 11.08.2008). Lavrov’s speech on the next day offered 
additional examples of how the Russian official discourse constructed the idea of a 
hypocritical Western/ American Other. In this speech, he criticized his American 
counterpart, Condoleezza Rice, for trying to dissuade the Russian Foreign Minister 
from labelling the conducts of Georgia’s military as genocide, ethnic cleansing and war 
crimes (which he considered “an obvious designation supported by testimonies of 
eyewitnesses and journalists covering the situation”) as well as denied outright her 
accusation that Russia was seeking to overthrow President Saakashvili, stating that “it 
is not a part of our political culture and not in the tool-box of our foreign policy to 
engage in the dethroning-enthroning exercise. That's what others do, whom we know” 
– refereeing to the United States’ notorious record of engineering regime changes.  
In the context of Russia’s military interventions in Crimea and Donbas, the West 
continued to be portrayed as the antagonist force behind the chaotic situations unfolding 
in Ukraine and as the main facilitator of the Ukrainian Other’s aggressive behaviors. 
Putin’s speech on the annexation of Crimea, for instance, contained a lengthy and 
indignant description of the West’s exceptionalism and hypocrisy, juxtaposing them 
with the honorability and responsibleness of the Russian Self. In the speech, Putin 
denounced the West states for disregarding international laws and trying to overthrow 
the government of a sovereign country: “Our western partners, led by the United States 
of America, prefer not to be guided by international law in their practical policies, but 
by the rule of the gun” (Putin 18.03.2014). The degree of antagonism attached to the 
Western Other in Russia’s discourse on Crimea was conspicuously greater than was the 
case with the discourse on Georgia – instead of just being partially responsible, the 
Western Other was represented right from the start as instigator of the crises which 
necessitated the intervention of the Russian Self. For example, Lavrov wrote in his The 
Guardian’s opinion piece that the undemocratic and unconstitutional coup in Kyiv was 
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conducted “with the direct participation of ministers and other officials from the US 
and EU countries” (Lavrov 07.04.2014). Moreover, the EU’s Association Agreement 
and the Eastern Partnership were portrayed as geopolitical tools of the West to impose 
its desires on the Ukrainian people and turn Ukraine into a satellite state of the EU 
(Lavrov 30.03.2014). Among the Western states, the U.S. Other was portrayed in an 
especially harsh light as the one country who played the most significant role in 
manipulating the crisis in Ukraine and orchestrated the Western states’ reactions to it. 
The European states, on the other hand, were regarded as being led astray by their 
American ally (Putin 18.03.2014; Lavrov 14.06.2014).  
In summary, across the selected cases and texts, Russian intervention narratives 
routinely assigned the roles of ‘antagonists’ to the Western as well as Georgian and 
Ukrainian Others –  hence, the tropes of ‘Western exceptionalism’, ‘unilateralism’, 
‘color revolutions’, ‘NATO/ EU expansion’, ‘double standard’, etc. made frequent 
appearance in the examined texts. The attitudes to the Western Other, however, varied 
among the examined cases and sometime even fluctuated over the course of a studied 
period. Moreover, while the West was frequently represented as a monolithic group to 
which Russian officials collectively referred as ‘our Western partners’, ‘our European 
& American colleagues’ or simply ‘the West’/ ‘Western countries’, the heterogeneity 
and incongruousness existing under these generic labels were also emphasized by the 
speakers/ writers in efforts to particularize the attitudes of the Russian Self toward 
certain national Others (or groups of national Others, such as NATO or EU) within ‘the 
West’. Finally, it should be noted that even in its most radical articulations, Russian 
official discourse still maintain the prospects for ‘cooperation’ and ‘understanding’ 
between the Russian Self and ‘Western partners’; this reluctance to antagonize the 
Western Other signifies persisting normative and material dependency of Russia on the 
Western core (Morozov 2015), which despite symbolic triumphs of Russia’s military 
interventions continue to limit the realm of possibility for the Russian Subject. 
1.2. Representations of the Georgian/ Ukrainian Others 
  While the West was discursively constructed as an adversary (whose double 
standard and exceptionalism regarding R2P the Russian Self endeavored to subvert) but 
still regarded as an Subject to whom the Russia Self sought to establish equal relations 
(in order to conceal its material and normative dependence), representations of the 
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Georgian and Ukrainian Others were constructed primarily through representational 
strategies of vilification and negation which resembled those of the post-Cold War 
discourses and practices of interventionism (Orford 2003: 171-175). Through 
vilification (attributing negative characteristics to the extent of reducing the adversaries 
to inhumane villains) and negation (depriving of the effective agency essential for self-
determination), intervention narratives ascribe to the Others the attributions that stood 
in stark contrast with civilizedness, rationality and potency (which are linked to the 
Self), thus depriving those Others of the qualities needed to be self-governing Subjects 
and legitimizing external interventions against it. 
Indeed, in Russian intervention narratives, the two post-Soviet countries were 
portrayed as non-democratic and failed states which needed to be intervened in order 
to rescue the populations (of whom many were seen as Russian citizens or compatriots). 
The leaderships of Georgia and Ukraine were stigmatized as transgressors and 
corrupted politicians, who led their countries to conflict and disunity to satisfy their 
corrupt political ambitions. In the former case, the actions of the Georgian side from 
the very beginning were framed as gross violations of international laws as well as its 
previous commitments to the peace process. Among other things, they were portrayed 
as “aggressive actions against the South Ossetian people” which were conducted in 
total disregard of “the UN General Assembly resolution appeal to observe Olympic 
Peace during the Beijing Olympic Games” (Lavrov 08.08.2008). Especially, Georgian 
soldiers were frequently described as those who opened fire at the Russian 
peacekeepers with whom they were supposed to cooperate – thus framing their actions 
as a dishonorable violation of the norms of international peacekeeping (Medvedev 
08.08.2008, Lavrov 12.08.2008).  
From the initial framing of Georgia’s military operation as a one-sided act of 
aggression that broke international laws, the vilification of the Georgian leadership as 
human right violators and war criminals became prevalent after Putin’s visit to North 
Ossetia-Alania. In Vladikavkaz, Putin began to openly describe the actions of the 
Georgian side as “a crime against their own people” and “a crime against Ossetian 
people” which caused a humanitarian crisis affecting thousands of people, including 
many Russian citizens (Putin 09.08.2008). The case against Georgia was reinforced by 
Putin on the next day, when he reported to Medvedev that “elements of a kind of 
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genocide against the Ossetian people” (who, as he was at pains to point out, were also 
Russian citizens) were evident (Medvedev & Putin 10.08.2008). Afterward, charges of 
ethnic cleansing, genocide and war crimes were publicly laid by the Russian 
government against Saakashvili’s regime and the Georgian leader personally. In the 
Russian discourse, Saakashvili was vilified as a dangerous, untrustworthy and power-
hungry politician in the mold of Third World dictators. Not only chargeable for causing 
the humanitarian catastrophe in South Ossetia, the Georgian President was also 
portrayed as an authoritarian ruler who came to power “not via elections” (Lavrov 
14.08.2008) and who ordered “the dispersals of demonstrations, the brutal restrictions 
on opposition activities, and the shutdown of opposition media” (Lavrov 28.08.2008) 
and “opted for genocide to accomplish his political objectives” (Medvedev 
26.08.2008). Lavrov (14.08.2008) even explicitly described Saakashvili as a deranged 
person: “There are no crazy leaders there who would be preoccupied with destroying 
their own states and settling the conflicts by the use of force, as the leadership of 
Georgia did in South Ossetia and Abkhazia”.   
Similarly, to justify the annexation of Crimea, the official discourse used the 
representational strategies of vilification and negation to constructed the new Ukrainian 
government that emerged out of the Euromaidan movement as illegal, illegitimate, and 
therefore incapable of representing the Ukrainian people. The politicians in both the old 
and new regimes were labelled as oligarchs, corrupt officials or ultranationalists (“They 
milked the country, fought among themselves for power, assets and cash flows and did 
not care much about the ordinary people”, Putin 18.03.2014). Framing the overthrown 
of Yanukovych as an unconstitutional coup d’etat, the offical discourse refused to 
acknowledge the legitimacy of the post-Yanukovych Ukrainian government and 
portrayed the members of it as “nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-
Semites” (Putin 18.03.2014). Not only unable to protect the Russian-speaking 
populations, the new regime was portrayed as actively seeking to victimize ethnic 
Russians and Russian speakers living in Ukraine. The new government’s policy to 
restrict the use of Russian as an official language, for example, was repeatedly put forth 
as an example of Kyiv’s anti-Russian attitude (Putin 04.06.2014). The Ukrainian 
government was also depicted, like the Georgian government before, as a non-
democratic regime which was using violent force against its own people, leading to a 
grave humanitarian crisis in Donetsk and Lugansk. In the Russian intervention 
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narrative, the Ukrainian Other therefore ceased to be regarded as a functioning national 
authority and even as a unitary state (“It is also obvious that there is no legitimate 
executive authority in Ukraine now, nobody to talk to. Many government agencies have 
been taken over by the impostors, but they do not have any control in the country”, 
Putin 18.03.2014; “the unitary state no longer functions in Ukraine”, Lavrov 
16.04.2014).  
To detach the Maidan elites from the people they claimed to represent, the 
discourse often expressed sympathy with ordinary Maidan protesters but denounced the 
leaders of the movement, describing them as having selfish political agendas and 
wicked methods: “They resorted to terror, murder and riots” (Putin 18.03.2014). By 
sustaining the differentiation, the Russian official discourse sought to further de-
legitimize the democratic marking of the Euromaidan and the regime emerging from 
this movement in the eyes of Russians, Ukrainians and international observers. 
Although the sovereignty of Ukraine was not rejected per se, the discourse constructed 
the new Ukrainian government as powerless and unable to represent the Ukrainian 
people (if not actively misleading them).  
The negative descriptions of the Ukrainian Other, however, underwent a 
transformation later in 2014. Instead of denying the legitimacy of the new Ukrainian 
government, the official discourse began to recognize its status as well as the possibility 
of reconciliation between the government in Kyiv and the separatist group in Eastern 
Ukraine under the Minsk Agreement (Lavrov 29.12.2014). Even then, however, the 
Ukrainian side continued to be cast under less than positive light. For example, it was 
portrayed for persistently pursuing violent methods to resolve the conflict in Donbas, 
resulting in the failure of the first peace arrangement (Putin 23.01.2015). Thus, it can 
be concluded that while the strategy of negation was employed less and less, the official 
discourse persisted in vilifying the Ukrainian Other and depicting it as the opposite of 
the Russian heroic Self. 
In summary, negative representations of Georgia/ Ukraine and the Georgian/ 
Ukrainian leadership, constructed through strategies of vilification and negation, 
functioned to produce the antagonistic Other essential to humanitarian intervention 
heroic storylines. The goal of such representational practices, following the arguments 
of poststructuralist IR, was to construct the antagonistic Other as a complete opposite 
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of the Self and to deny it of the legitimacy to exercise political sovereignty. Through 
such negative representations, Russian discourse sought to construct the Georgian and 
Ukrainian Others into legitimate Objects for the Self’s heroic interventions.  
2. The Suffering Other: Representations of Russian Citizens and Compatriots 
Aside from representations of the antagonistic Other (the West and Georgian/ 
Ukrainian governments) against whom the Self must struggle, Russian discourses of 
military interventions also importantly constructed the suffering Other (in the forms of 
Russian citizens or compatriots living in South Ossetia, Crimea and Eastern Ukraine) 
who functioned as the main referents of Russia’s humanitarian and R2P-based 
justifications. Once again, the analysis indicated that across the three cases, Russia’s 
discursive representational practices pertaining to the suffering Other are not unlike 
those of the Western liberal humanitarian discourses. As Barnett (2011: 16) argued, the 
discourse of human rights focuses on the long-term goal of eliminating the causes of 
human suffering while the discourse of humanitarianism is based on the immediate 
goals of keeping people alive and punishing the perpetrators. Hence, discursive 
representations of sufferings and atrocities are essential for intervention narratives to 
invoke emotions and a sense of moral urgency which serve as the catalysts for the 
exceptional use of force.  
In the case of South Ossetia, the South Ossetian people were constructed as 
victims of cold-blooded acts of unprovoked aggression on the part of the Georgian 
regime. To elicit the helplessness of the victims, official speeches and documents often 
characterized them as peaceful and innocent inhabitants, of whom the majority was 
comprised of the elders, women and children (Lavrov 08.08.2008). The historical 
complexity of the conflict was simplified to a series of unilateral attempts of the 
Georgian leadership – from Gamsahourdia to Saakashvili – to subjugate the populations 
of South Ossetia through violent means (“annexing South Ossetia through the 
annihilation of a whole people”, Medvedev 26.08.2008). In terms of nationality/ 
ethnicity, South Ossetians were described as possessing Russian citizenships, hence 
linking the atrocities committed against them to an attack on the Russian Self. At the 
same time, the discourse also attached to the victims Georgian and Ossetian identities– 
the former to help framing the actions of the Georgian army as a crime against its own 
people, while the later – to construct them as acts of ethnic cleansing committed by the 
Georgian government against the South Ossetians. An example can be found in 
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Lavrov’s interview with Ekho Moskvy on 14 August, during which he remarked that 
“Mr. Saakashvili has inflicted colossal harm not only upon the South Ossetians, not 
only upon the Abkhaz, if you take the ethnic characteristic, but also upon the Georgians 
– his own people” (Lavrov 14.08.2008). The decision to recognize the independence of 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia was also framed in humanitarian languages as the only 
viable solution to prevent any further crises from arising (Lavrov 26.08.2008, 
Medvedev 26.08.2008).  
In the contexts of Russia’s interventions in Crimea and Donbas, the images of 
the suffering which were produced by the official discourse also resembled to a 
considerable extent the representational strategies used by other humanitarian 
intervention narratives. Ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers living in Ukraine were 
portrayed as constantly suffering from discriminations as well as political and economic 
hardships due to the incompetence of the Ukrainian government – with the 
undemocratic and unconstitutional coup d’état staged by ultranationalists in Kyiv being 
the final straw (Putin 18.03.2014, Lavrov 17.04.2014). At one point, Putin (24.10.2014) 
even declared the Russian nation as a whole to be the victim of “one the greatest 
humanitarian disasters of the 20th century” – by which he meant the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Another indication of how the Russian intervention narrative reproduced 
the tropes of post-Cold War humanitarianism to sustain the images of the suffering 
Other during the military intervention in Ukraine can be found in a series of White 
Books entitled “On Violations of Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Ukraine”, which 
were published by Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in April, June and November 
of 2014 (RMFA 2014). Following the language of human right reports, these 
documents provided detailed lists of ‘human right violations’ carried out by or in the 
name of the Euromaidan and the Ukrainian government against ethnic Russian 
populations and other minority groups in the country during the indicated periods of 
time. Interestingly, some of the ‘violations’ listed in these reports taken the forms of 
vandalizations and destructions of Soviet-era monuments to Lenin or the Red Army 
(RMFA 04.2014) – which served to corroborate the accusation that the Ukrainian Other 
was trying to erase the history and identity of Russian speakers in Ukraine, in addition 
to other human right violations.  
However, in both cases, the suffering Others were not portrayed only as passive 
victims – they were also positively linked with some of the attributes associated with 
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the heroic Self, such as “courage, dignity and bravery” and especially political agency 
(Putin 18.03.2014). Such depictions were essential to frame the interventions as 
disinterested applications of humanitarian norms and R2P rather than just one-sided 
military actions motivated by the antagonism of the interveners toward the antagonistic 
Other. In the case of Georgia, the offical discourse portrayed South Ossetian Other was 
praised for bravely defending their homeland with the support of the Russian Self 
against Georgia’s aggression: “You defended your land and justice was on your side. 
That is why you won, with the assistance of Russian peacekeepers, a reinforced 
peacekeeping contingent.” (Medvedev 14.08.2008). Similarly, to justify the annexation 
of Crimea, the “residents of Crimea” were described by the Russian discourse as true 
legitimate authority of Crimea and Sevastopol. Thus, it was repeatedly stressed, in 
virtually all official accounts, that the decision to secede from Ukraine and rejoin the 
Russian Federation was the expression of ordinary Crimeans’ political will through the 
mean of plebiscite. In a similar vein, the Russian discourse also depicted pro-Russian 
insurgents in Eastern Ukraine as desperate people who were forced to take up arms to 
protect their rights from being violated by the corrupt Ukrainian government (Putin 
17.04.2014). The discourse thus frequently proposed the federalization of Ukraine and 
the recognition of the political agency of the insurgents as the viable long-term solution 
to the ‘internal conflict’ of Ukraine (Lavrov 17.04.2014) 
  To sum up, in the studied cases, ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking 
populations (which were often used interchangeably in official discourses) living in the 
two post-Soviet states came to represent the victims of the antagonist Others.  Here as 
well, the representational strategy of negation was also employed to a certain extent to 
create symbols of helplessness – characters who lacked manifest power and agency 
(e.g. innocent, harmless civilians, the elders, women and children) to resist political 
oppression in an effective manner, thus motivating the Self’s heroic interventions. At 
the same time, the Other also need to be constructed as capable of transformation and 
development (via its struggles for self-determination or democracy), i.e. possessing 
latent agency, which make it more relatable to the Self. The ultimate dream of 
humanitarian intervention discourse, therefore, is similar to that of the civilizing 
mission, which involved “making objects in the image of the white subject, who reflect 
his desires and ambitions but do not quite achieve them” (Orford 2003: 172). Because 
the Russian discourses imagined the suffering Other as already possessing the Self’s 
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likeness (being ethnic Russian or Russian-speakers), however, the heroic mission of 
Russian humanitarian intervention was no longer ‘saving strangers’, as Wheeler (2001) 
put it, but ‘saving Russian compatriots’ – which can be considered a distortion to the 
hegemonic discourse of humanitarian intervention.  
V. REPRESENTATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN SUBJECT/ SELF 
This chapter tackles the construction of the Self in Russia’s discourses of 
military interventionism. Based on the analysis of texts in both Georgian and Ukrainian 
cases, it can be argued that Russia’s official discourses produced the Russian Self in the 
mold of the masculine and white Subject of previous humanitarian intervention 
narratives. As such, the Self was readily associated with righteousness, progress, 
martial power and agency vis-à-vis the wickedness, backwardness and impotency of 
the Other. At the same time, Russia’s official discourses also created a protagonist who 
was determined to challenge the West’s perceived oppression and restore the proper 
international order previously disrupted by the actions of the antagonists. The Subject 
produced by Russia’s official discourse thus reflected not only the idealized muscular 
hero of the post-Cold War humanitarian discourse, but also the subaltern dream of 
inverting the hegemonic order and replacing the Western hegemon (Morozov 2015: 
12).  
1. The Muscular Humanitarian of the Russo-Georgian War 
In the context of the 2008’s conflict with Georgia, it can be argued that the 
Russian Subject established a more visible martial presence than it did in the latter two 
cases. In fact, the heroic Self’s presence in the forms of the Russian peacekeeping force 
in South Ossetia even preceded the outbreak of the conflicting situation. The discourse 
portrayed the Russian forces in South Ossetia as selfless peacekeepers who, in the 
words of the Russian Foreign Minister, have “risked their lives to maintain peace, even 
if it was fragile, in the South Ossetia zone of conflict all these years” (Lavrov 
08.08.2008), and the unprovoked attack on these peacekeepers by Georgian forces was 
given as one of the main reasons for Russia’s military actions. The depiction of the 
Russian military’s prior deployment as a legitimate exercise in international 
peacekeeping served to obscure the responsibilities of Russian Self in creating the 
conflicting situation and presented it instead as a blameless victim of Georgia’s 
aggression (e.g. “Russia has maintained and continues to maintain a presence on 
Georgian territory on an absolutely lawful basis, carrying out its peacekeeping mission 
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in accordance with the agreements concluded”, Medvedev 08.08.2008). Hence, the 
decision the use force against Georgia was not constructed as an entirely ‘new’ military 
intervention, but a necessary step to carry out Russia’s pre-existing peacemaking 
mission “to its logical conclusion” (Putin 11.08.2008) and repulse the attempt of the 
Georgian Other to disrupt the established regional order.   
While seeking to obscure Russia’s responsibilities in engendering the crisis, the 
discourse was unequivocal in asserting the heroic Self’s perceived ‘responsibility to 
protect’ Russian citizens living in South Ossetia. References to the sufferings of South 
Ossetians and Russian citizen coalesced into an urgent call to action which the Self 
cannot deny without undermining its own integrity. Underlying this idea was the 
production of an honorable, resolute, assertive yet empathetic Russian Self – in other 
words, as the embodiment of a humanitarian hero. Linking the Self with the traits of 
honorability and responsibleness, the official discourse portrayed the actions 
undertaken by the Self as fully in alignment with it national as well as international 
obligations and duties. For example, already in his first statement, Medvedev declared 
that it was the duty of the Russian government “to protect the lives and dignity of 
Russian citizens wherever they may be” (Medvedev 08.08.2008) – a claim to the right 
of guardianship that would be repeatedly made by Russian officials in later texts. Like 
previous humanitarian narratives, the Russian narrative also imbued the Russian Self 
with the power to intervene in the humanitarian crisis in a decisive and swift manner to 
save innocent lives and punish the perpetrators. Adamant in its struggle against 
Georgia’s aggression (which was compared to “surgical methods” by Medvedev), the 
Russian government was portrayed as equally compassionate and dedicated in its 
efforts to provide humanitarian reliefs to South Ossetian people (Putin 11.08.2008, 
Medvedev 12.08.2008). 
Not only transforming the Russian Self into the masculine Subject of post-Cold 
War humanitarianism, Russia’s official discourse also importantly imagined the Self as 
a defiant Subject who steadfastly performed ordained humanitarian duties in the face 
of the Western Other’s opposition and sabotage. Despite Russia’s legal objections to 
humanitarian intervention and R2P, the discourses still constructed the Russian Self’s 
intervention in South Ossetia mostly in terms of an application of R2P – albeit Russia’s 
rendition of R2P was presented as morally superior and more effective than the Western 
ones. While Western states’ motivations for conducting these interventions were 
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presented as problematic, the Russian Self’s fraternal bonds with both the South 
Ossetian and Georgian peoples and traditional geopolitical presence in the Caucasus 
were cited to substantiate Russia’s claim to the right to use force (Medvedev 
31.08.2008). For example, Medvedev declared that Russia’s peace enforcing operation 
was conducted “in accordance with the United Nations Charter” and “absolutely 
effective and the only possible option” and contrasted it to the “lessons of the 1938 
Munich Agreement”, i.e. the policy of appeasement practiced by European political 
leaders before the Second World War (a comparison which had the added effect of 
linking Saakashvili’s Georgia to Hitler’s Germany) (Medvedev 10.08.2008).  
In a similar vein, Lavrov explained the need to maintain Russian peacekeepers 
in South Ossetia by invoking the failure of Dutch peacekeepers to prevent the massacre 
of Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica, stating that “we will not find ourselves in such a 
position, and our peacekeepers will never be in such a situation” (Lavrov 
12.08.2008)12. After Russia officially recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia, 
comparison to Western states’ recognition of the independence of Kosovo were 
repeatedly evoked – for example, in interviews with domestic and international 
television networks following his announcement, Medvedev described the decision to 
recognize the two breakaway Georgian regions as similar yet more legitimate in 
comparison to the case of Kosovo (“In the case of Kosovo we did not see sufficient 
reason for recognizing a new subject of international law, but in this case, in order to 
prevent the killing of people and a humanitarian catastrophe, in order for justice to 
triumph and for these peoples to realize their right to self-determination, we have 
recognized their independence” (Medvedev 26.08.2008). The Self’s geographical 
closeness and emotional links to the suffering Other thus served to distinguish Russia’s 
military intervention from those of the West, which usually aimed to rescue people 
living in faraway lands and having few connections with the intervening Subject 
(Wheeler 2001).    
2.  “Polite People” and Reluctant Humanitarian: Self-Representations of the 
Russian Subject during the Conflicts in Ukraine 
In the case of Crimea and Donbas, it can be argued that the Russian Self was 
actively trying to conceal the true extent of its military interventions – or even the 
                                                           
12 Churkin also used the same argument in his interview with PBS’s Charlie Rose on the same day (the 
transcript of which is available at https://charlierose.com/videos/11624).  
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factuality of the interventions themselves. It thus conducted in Crimea what Roy 
Allison (2014) termed ‘deniable interventions’. Thus, the Subject became less visible 
militarily but still retained the central roles in the narratives. The institutional Self (the 
Russian president and government) were especially regarded as a guardian of stability, 
peace and rationality, imbued with attractive attributes that contrast sharply with those 
of the antagonists. For instance, Lavrov wrote in his article on The Guardian 
(07.04.2014) that Russia had always worked to promote security, stability and 
integration in the Eurasia region, and only the Western powers’ hubris had threatened 
peace and brought about the Ukrainian crisis. In the same vein, Putin’s speech 
(18.03.2014) presented images of the Russian Self as accommodating, patient, 
responsible and just vis-à-vis the aggressiveness, unilateralism, irresponsibility and 
hypocrisy of the Western Other. Against accusations that Russia was trying to act 
imperially and restore the Soviet Union, the standard response was categorical denials 
– the Russian Self was portrayed instead as pursuing its legitimate interests and helping 
the suffering people in southern and eastern Ukraine. Sanctions imposed by the West 
were constructed as unproductive against the unity and self-sufficiency of the Russian 
Subject:  
“Russia is a self-sufficient country. We will work within the foreign 
economic environment that has taken shape, develop domestic production and 
technology and act more decisively to carry out transformation. Pressure from 
outside, as has been the case on past occasions, will only consolidate our 
society.” (Putin 24.10.2014) 
The martial/ muscular side of the Subject, however, was somewhat concealed 
during the interventions, as the role of the Russian military was not fully disclosed by 
official sources. Putin (18.03.2014), for example, was initially adamant that “Russia’s 
Armed Forces never entered Crimea; they were there already in line with an 
international agreement”, “They keep talking of some Russian intervention in Crimea, 
some sort of aggression. This is strange to hear”. However, he later admitted in a Q&A 
session that the ‘little green men’ previously dubbed ‘local self-defense forces’ were in 
facts Russian soldiers, but stressed that their presence in Crimea only served to secure 
the organization of the referendum (Putin 17.04.2014). Similarly, the Russian official 
discourse until the end of the studied time frame consistently denied the involvement 
of the Russian military in Eastern Ukraine.  
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Regardless, it is noteworthy that representations of violence committed by the 
Russian military in Crimea were particularly lacking, especially when compared to 
humanitarian interventions conducted by the West and to the Russian army’s record up 
to that point. In the other instances, the use of brutal forces against the antagonistic, 
unreformable Other was a hallmark of post-Cold War interventionism. It derived from 
the ‘bare life’ logic which reduces the enemies of human rights, democracy and Western 
civilization (such as terrorists or those who committed genocides) to non-humans, 
thereby enabling the use of excessive and exceptional violence against them (Vaughan-
Williams 2009: 103-105). Regarding representations of the use of force, the Russian 
state and military are on a par with their Western counterparts. For instance, images of 
the military’s use of violence against Chechen insurgents were part and parcel of the 
Russian media reportage on the Second Chechen War (Casula 2015). Similarly, after 
the military intervention in South Ossetia in 2008, the fact that Russian army’s 
unsatisfactory performance was widely discussed attested the centrality of martial self-
representations to the discourse of interventionism (Reuters 2008). In this respect, the 
performance that the Russian marital Self achieved in Crimea and Sevastopol were 
crucial to the Russian narrative. They were constructed as evidence of the military’s 
“new quality and possibilities” and “the personnel’s high moral spirit” (Putin 
28.03.2014). In the final analysis, this aspect of the Subject arguably helped to create 
an image of a modern, disciplined, and well-mannered military Self that not only 
contradicted those of the opposition but also represented a clear ‘maturity’ in 




VI. CONCLUSION  
This study was conducted with the objective of examining the Russian official 
discourses of military interventionism pertaining to the Near Abroad geopolitical space. 
In the empirical analysis, two cases were studied – namely Russia’s military 
interventions in Georgia in 2008 and ongoing involvement in Ukraine, beginning with 
the annexation of Crimea in March 2014. For the first case, 08 August 2008 and 31 
August 2008 were chosen as the starting and end dates of the analytical timeframe 
respectively. Concerning Moscow’s ongoing military intervention in Ukraine, I decide 
to limit the corresponding analysis to the period between Russia’s annexation of Crimea 
(beginning with Putin’s speech on 18 March 2014) to the Minsk II Agreement in 
February 2015.  
Following the poststructuralist IR framework, I understand foreign policy (of 
which military interventionism is a component) as practices of (re)producing 
boundaries between inside/ outside, internal/ external and Self/ Other that constitute the 
conditions of possibility for identity discourses. Therefore, the purpose of the analysis 
is to examine how certain representational practices underlie the production of the Self/ 
Other binaries in Russia’s intervention narratives and how these representations 
enabled the course of actions taken by the Russian authorities. Additionally, the 
analysis is also concerned with the production of imaginative geographies in Russia’s 
military intervention narratives – which can be defined as representations of ‘own’ and 
‘other’ places which form the geographical/ geopolitical background for the 
interactions between the Self and the Other. Underlying notions of ‘near’ and ‘far’, 
‘our’ and ‘foreign lands’, imaginative geographies contribute not only to the production 
of Otherness but also to the Subject’s self-identification. The empirical part thus divided 
and analyzed the examined discourses based on three analytical categories: 
representations of the Self, representations of the Other and the imaginative 
geographies.  
First, the analysis of imaginative geographies demonstrated that Russian 
intervention narratives subsumed the objects of its military interventions – Georgia and 
Ukraine – as well as the territories under contestation (South Ossetia, Crimea, Donbas) 
into a ‘Near Abroad’ post-imperial geopolitical imaginary. At the same time, Russian 
geopolitical imaginary also linked its military interventions with the subaltern dream of 
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challenging the geopolitical domination of the Western hegemon. Military 
interventions were based simultaneously on Russia’s post-imperial ‘sphere of 
privileged interests’ and counter-hegemonic challenges the Eurocentric hegemonic 
order.  
Secondly, the analysis showed that representations of the Others in Russia’s 
discourses of military interventions to a considerable extent reproduced the structure of 
the post-Cold War humanitarian intervention discourse. On the one hand, the Russian 
discourses constructed Western and Georgian/ Ukrainian Others as the instigators and 
perpetrators of the crimes against humanity that the Russian heroic Self must address. 
On the other hand, the people living in the territories of South Ossetia, Crimea and 
Donbas appeared in the discourses as the victims of human right violations, ethnic 
cleansing and genocide in urgent need of assistances and salvation from the Self. At the 
same time, the discourses also constructed the suffering Other as possessing latent 
agency and capable of advancing its own causes against the oppression of the antagonist 
Other.  
Thirdly, regarding the construction of the Subject/ Self, the analysis showed that 
the Russian heroic Self was produced simultaneously as an embodiment of the 
humanitarian heroic Subject (identical to ways the masculine and white Subject of post-
Cold War humanitarianism was produced) and as a counter-hegemonic hero who was 
determined to challenge perceived injustices and restore the international order 
previously disrupted by the actions of the antagonist Others to the proper state – a heroic 
figure which reflects the subaltern desire of inverting the hegemonic order and 
replacing the Master. If the first image of the Self placed it on equal footing with the 
Western humanitarian Subject, the second sought to subvert the hegemony of the West 
on humanitarianism and present the Self’s military intervention as a legitimate – if not 
superior – rendition of the humanitarian/ R2P narrative.  
The empirical findings thus corroborated the dissertation’s assumption that the 
Russian discourse of military interventionism was hybrid and both reproduces and 
distorts the hegemonic post-Cold War discourse of humanitarian intervention and R2P 
(although it must be noted that the distortions did not amount to Russia’s discourse 
being an alternative formulation of humanitarianism). As discussed in the theoretical 
chapter, the notion that Russia was articulating a normative challenge to Western brands 
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of humanitarianism and R2P has been put forth and analyzed by scholars informed by 
English School and Constructivist approaches of IR, such as Allison (2013) Averre & 
Davies (2015) and Kuhrt (2015). However, previous analyses often overlooked the 
inconsistencies in Russia’s discourses of R2P and humanitarian interventions within 
and without the Near Abroad geopolitical space, as well as the ways in which Russian 
discourses reproduced the hegemonic post-Cold War discourses of military 
interventionism. Additionally, even when the incongruity in the Russian discourses was 
acknowledged and somewhat explained through the notions of hybrid pluralism or dual 
normative order (by Allison 2013), there was still a lack of conceptualization 
concerning the ways in which Russia’s position in the international system begot  its 
hybrid normative impulses.  
To address this issue, I have proposed to engage the empirical analysis of 
Russia’s discourse of interventionism with the postcolonial theory-informed concept of 
the subaltern empire (Morozov 2013, 2015; Tlostanova 2008). According to the 
subaltern empire theory, as a subaltern empire – which possesses both subalternity vis-
à-vis the Western core and post-Soviet periphery-oriented hegemonic aspirations – 
Russia had no alternative source of moral authority and legitimacy to turn to but the 
normative order which was established by the Eurocentric hegemony. This condition is 
apparent even as Russia was pursuing its own normative and hegemonic projects in the 
post-Soviet neighborhood – the Russian elites largely consider themselves as part of 
the Eurocentric order, and as such, it continues to promote the very same normative 
project in its own periphery. Consequently, Russia’s efforts to articulate a normative 
challenge to the Western discourse of military interventionism still cannot avoid 
reproducing the same justifications, rhetoric and legal languages originated from the 
Western normative order. In this sense, Russia’s subaltern mimesis is not simply the 
matter of instrumentalizing the language of humanitarianism for justificatory or 
counter-normative purposes as some scholars have claimed (for example, see Holmes 
and Krastev 2015) – more importantly, it also represents a clear symptom of Russia’s 
subalternity, of its normative dependency on the Western core.  
Linking this assumption with the empirical findings, it became apparent that 
even when moving away from purely normative content and taking into account the 
production of Self/ Other as well as the imaginative geographies underlying their 
relations, Russian official discourses still bear many structural similarities to the 
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hegemonic post-Cold War discourse of humanitarianism. The production of the Self as 
the Subject and of the Others as the Objects of Russia’s military interventions for 
example involves making claims and evoking images in similar terms to those 
employed by previous humanitarian intervention and R2P-based narratives. At the same 
time, we can still detect the tensions between the subaltern and the post-imperial facets 
of Russia’s interventionism in the articulations of a counter-hegemonic geopolitical 
imaginary (which is simultaneously hegemonic vis-à-vis Russian neighboring states), 
the antagonization of the Western Other and the production of the Self as a counter-
hegemonic protagonist.  Thus, it can be concluded that the Russian Subject produced 
by Russia’s official discourses of military interventions was still very much a hybrid 
Subject.  
Of course, limitations regarding the size and scope of the examined cases and 
texts mean that the empirical findings of the dissertation represent only a fraction of the 
official discourses and the fields of discursivity (which also included inter alia wider 
social debates, academic and marginalized discourses) concerning Russia’s military 
interventionism. Future analyses that take into examination Russian official discourses 
in different contexts or other types of discourses may offer new angles from which to 
understand Russia’s imperial subalternity. For instance, it would be interesting to 
examine the discourse surrounding Russia’s decision not to intervene in Kyrgyzstan in 
2010. Comparatively, Russian discourses of military interventionism pertaining to both 
the Near Abroad and the Far Aboard (which most recently involves Russia’s military 
campaign in Syria) can be analyzed in conjunction with humanitarian/ R2P discourses 
in other subaltern/ non-Western contexts, for example Brazil’s “Responsibility while 
Protecting” Proposal or military interventions carried out under the auspices of the 
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